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Abstract
The Constitution allocates entitlements to individuals and also institutions such as
states and branches. It is familiar fare that individuals’ entitlements are routinely
deployed not only as shields against unconstitutional action, but also as
bargaining chips when negotiating with the state. By contrast, the possibility that
branches and states could bargain over structural entitlements has largely
escaped scholarly or judicial attention. Yet institutional negotiation over
federalism and separation-of-powers interests is both endemic and unavoidable.
To ascertain when such negotiation should be allowed, this Article develops a
general theory of negotiated structural arrangements by leveraging doctrinal,
economic and political theory insights. Negotiated structural outcomes, the
Article concludes, should be deemed constitutional absent a clear demonstration
of negative externalities or paternalism-warranting ‘internalities.’
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Introduction
The Constitution vests individuals and institutions alike with
entitlements. It is familiar fare that individuals can invoke those rights not
only as shields, but also as chips in bargaining with the state. Accepting a
plea bargain, negotiating a regulatory exaction to zoning rules, and
accepting speech restrictions as a condition of government funding: All
these are familiar deals with the state involving the trade of a constitutional
right. A voluminous literature addresses the permissible scope of such deal
making.1
No parallel literature, however, explores the analogous possibility
that institutions such as states or branches might bargain over their
constitutional entitlements. The lacuna is puzzling. For individuals are
hardly alone in striking constitutional deals. Consider how many landmarks
of structural constitutionalism concern the results of bargaining over
institutional interests:




Article I of the Constitution vests the executive with exclusive veto
power over legislation.2 During the twentieth-century, presidents have
repeatedly transferred to Congress a portion of that veto power in
exchange for greater regulatory discussion, first over executive branch
reorganizations, and then more generally.3 The practice ended in 1983
only after high court intervention.4
In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress enacted statutes singling out state
officials to comply with administrative responsibilities set forth in
federal statutes.5 Taking to the courts, states parried successfully by
claiming an inalienable entitlement not to have administrative capacity

1

Classic treatments include RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993); Seth
F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). These works are almost exclusively concerned with
bargaining with individuals, not institutions.
2
U.S. CONST. art. 1, §7, cl.2.
3
See infra text accompanying note 108.
4
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
5
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924, 925A (provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act).
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commandeered by federal law.6 Now, states cannot be commandeered,
but they can trade that entitlement for federal funds.7
Congress is the constitutionally designated first mover on fiscal
matters.8 But legislators face serious collective-action problems,
rendering them prone to excessive deficit spending.9 In response,
legislators attempted to bind themselves by directing the Comptroller
General to sequester funds when the federal budget exceeded designated
annualized ceilings.10 Delegating to the Comptroller General, Congress
sought to alienate a portion of its Article I patrimony to an entity that
could act without bicameralism and presentment—a novation found
subsequently to violate the Constitution.11

These examples are not outliers. Institutional deal-making populates the
constitutional order as densely as trading over individual rights. Conditional
spending enactments, cooperative federalism programs, and even
preemptive legislation provide potent venues for federal-state exchange.
Congress and the executive have also long experimented with diverse
permutations of the law-making process, including the legislative veto,
fiscal sequester mechanisms, line-item vetoes, and presidential budgeting.
Institutional bargaining then is hardly the exception; it is often the rule.
This Article presents a theory of institutional bargaining and its
limits.12 The theory draws upon economic theories of bargaining between
6

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (endorsing the use of federal funds
to“influence a State's legislative choices”).
8
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, §7, cl.1.
9
John F. Cogan, The Dispersion of Spending Authority and Federal Budget Deficits, in
THE BUDGET PUZZLE: UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL SPENDING 26–27 (John F. Cogan et al.
eds., 1994).
10
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
11
Id.
12
Previous studies tend to focus on single federal authorities, such as the spending power,
see, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after
NFIB, 101 GEO. L. J. 861 (2013); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after
Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995); Thomas McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional
Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85; or the Eleventh
Amendment, see Daniel Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 141 (1996), or commandeering doctrine, see Erin Ryan, Federalism at
the ‘Cathedral’: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth
Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,2 (2010) [hereinafter Ryan,
‘Cathedral’]. A recent piece argues for “federalism bargaining” via secondary markets and
auctions. F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Coase and the Constitution: A New Approach to Federalism,
14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 593, 599–604 (2011). This proposal is both unnecessary (as
7
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individuals to model the permissible space for institutional deals. The basic
intuition is simply expressed. Private bargaining is typically viewed as
augmenting social welfare through Pareto-efficient trades.13 The apotheosis
of that perspective is the Coase theorem. This predicts that private parties
will bargain to efficient results regardless of how the law assigns initial
entitlements if transaction costs are zero.14 Of course, transaction costs are
rarely zero. Initial allocations of rights15 and the law’s election between
property and liability rules16 will often have welfare effects. Moreover,
private law theorists have identified conditions under which bargaining
should be prohibited via inalienability rules.17 Drawing on these law-andeconomic tools, as well as political science and doctrinal insights, I propose
a default rule for structural constitutional deals and two circumstances in
which the default can be overcome: Simply put, I argue that the outcomes
of intermural bargaining should be immune from constitutional assault
absent a substantiated concern about negative externalities or paternalismwarranting internalities.
Institutional bearers of vested constitutional interest, to be sure, do
not necessarily behave like individuals. It is thus not sufficient to translate
in mechanical fashion the legal and normative frameworks for private
bargaining to the institutional context. Rather, my aim in this study is to
demonstrate—not to assume—that private bargaining provides a useful
model for the structural constitutional context. As a threshold matter, we
might note that some key differences between institutions and individuals
intermural bargains happen without markets or auctions) and implausible. The one more
ambitious work I have identified is still narrowly focused on the scope of departmentalist
interpretive authority. John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in
Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequences of Rational Choice in the Separation of
Powers, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1993). McGinnis’s useful work develops a
powerful set of reasons for expecting that endogenous interbranch settlements by
bargaining and accommodation will be pervasive, id. at 295–99, but does not develop an
account of their proper boundaries. My account of bargaining not only rests on different
normative grounds, but also identifies its limits.
13
See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521 (1945).
14
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960).
15
For example, in incomplete contracts. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L. J. 729, 729
n.1 (1992) (collecting citations to literature).
16
A property rule means that property can only be transferred with the owner’s consent; a
liability rule allows transfer without consent but with compensation determined by a third
party. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972).
17
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 931, 934-35 (1985).
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render bargaining more salient for institutional than individual holders of
constitutional entitlements. Branches of the federal government and states,
unlike individuals, cannot exit from undesirable constitutional arrangements
by physically departing a jurisdiction.18 Further, changing the constitutional
dispensation through textual amendment is often practically impossible
given Article V’s rigidity.19 At the same time, institutional bargaining might
well have higher stakes than individual bargaining over constitutional
entitlements. The Framers believed structural rules would be pivotal to the
Constitution’s design.20 Negotiated compromises of architectural principles
might undermine the Constitution’s central aims of fostering democratic
accountability and producing national public goods.
To date, scholars and jurists have employed either formalist or
functionalist approaches to these structural constitutional problems.21 But
neither formalist nor functionalist lenses has proved capable of generating
stable, coherent solutions.22 Rather than seeking answers in inconclusive
constitutional texts, open-ended historical evidence, or abstract conceptual
analysis, the theory of intermural relations herein developed directs
attention to a central mechanism through which institutions interact. By
modeling this mechanism’s outcomes, the theory provides a simple,
18

See Adam Cox & Adam Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere:
Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 63 (2013)
(“Exit generates unconstitutional conditions questions by making every government
imposition at least nominally optional.”). State secession is now illegal. Texas v. White, 74
U.S. 700, 724–25 (1869) (“What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more
perfect, is not?”).
19
See Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. -- (forthcoming 2014)
[hereinafter “Huq, Function of Article V”]; see also infra text accompanying notes 220 to
222.
20
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed., 1987)
(explaining that bills of rights “would contain various exceptions to powers which are not
granted: and … would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted”).
21
See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000) (demonstrating historical equivocation between formalist
and functionalist modes of analysis); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches
to Separation-of-Powers Questions--A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488
(1987).
22
Work by Elizabeth Magill in the separation-of-powers context is especially useful; her
conceptual analyses of balance and structural equilibrium has obvious translation to the
federalism context. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1194–97 (2000) [hereinafter “Magill, Real Separation”] (“We
do not know what ‘balance’ means, and we do not know how it is achieved or
maintained.”); accord M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604 (2001).
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transubstantive framework for analyzing a wide spectrum of novel
institutional arrangements.
The study’s primary aim is accordingly to limn a general framework
for dissecting structural constitutional dilemmas. That framework is perhaps
most directly meant to illuminate and guide the behavior of political-branch
actors taking frontline decisions about when to enter institutional bargains,
and to facilitate public evaluation and criticism of “departmentalist” legal
judgments underwriting intermural deals.23 The theory has secondary
relevance to judicial doctrine. When officials decline to enter intermural
deals, courts lack a justiciable controversy to resolve. Even when a deal is
struck courts’ comparative epistemic weakness in predicting structural
change’s effects undermine the case for broad judicial superintendence.24
Exceptional judicial caution therefore should be exercised prior to
invalidating a novel structural arrangement.
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I defines the concept of
‘bargaining’ for the purposes of my inquiry. It then summarizes the
dominant theories of bargaining in private law. Turning to structural
constitutionalism, Part II demonstrates the pervasiveness of institutional
bargaining by documenting the practice in both separation of powers and
federalism contexts. The ensuing taxonomy suggests that the Court’s
current doctrine lacks coherence. The balance of the Article accordingly
develops an alternative normative evaluation of the practice building on
Coasean principles. First, Part III defends a positive default rule for
institutional bargains parallel to the default rule used in the ordinary
marketplace. Part IV then specifies two limiting conditions—externalities
and paternalism-warranting internalities—also drawn by analogy from the
private law context.25 In concluding, I reassess the role of judicial
enforcement of this framework.
23

For studies of departmentalist practice, see, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial
Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of
the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005).
24
For skeptical treatments of judicial competence in structural constitutional questions, see,
e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2013)
[hereinafter “Huq, Standing”]; Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter “Huq, Removal”].
25
A threshold point about terminology: In this Article, I use the phrases intermural
bargaining, institutional bargaining, and structural constitutional negotiation
interchangeably to refer to the same phenomenon. Variation in vocabulary is employed for
the purely stylistic reason of avoiding leaden prose. Unless otherwise noted, nothing except
for stylistic felicity rests on my terminological election at any given instant.
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I.

Bargaining over Individual Entitlements in Public and Private
Law

This Part defines bargaining for the purposes of this study. It
explores how courts analyze bargaining over individual entitlements in both
private and public law contexts. In both domains, bargaining is permitted
absent an argument from externalities or paternalism. This intuition
provides a potent starting point for analyzing structural constitutional deals.
A.

What is Bargaining?

This Article is concerned with instances in which institutions
actively negotiate the allocation of entitlements created by the Constitution.
What, though, counts as a negotiated bargain over an entitlement,
constitutional or otherwise? According to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, a bargain is “an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange
a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.”26 The
Restatement elaborates that “a performance or a return promise [is]
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and
is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”27 Bargains thus
embody “reciprocal … inducement.”28
In harmony with this approach, I focus here on a class of intermural
bargains with the following characteristics: (1) a stable equilibrium (2)
respecting the allocation of institutional authority between states or
branches that (3) is the outcome of interbranch or intergovernmental
negotiation between officials acting in their official capacity. This definition
does not resolve all boundary disputes (e.g., how long must an institution
endure before it counts as stable? when are officials acting in an official, as
oppose to partisan capacity?). But it is sufficiently precise to pick out a
class of phenomena—e.g., the line-item veto, the budget lockbox, and the
office of the independent counsel—for the purpose of analysis here.
Further, the definition is sufficiently capacious that it reaches both bargains
that are instantiated in the form of law or regulations and bargains distilled

26

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
Id. § 71.
28
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 293-94 (Dover Publications, Inc.
1991) (1881); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981) (“In the
typical bargain, the consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive or
inducement.”).
27
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into informal or conventional agreements enforced through a tacit threat of
future retaliation.29
This definition seems to elide the possibility that institutions can be
coerced such that an agreement should be ranked as involuntary. There is a
large literature about coercion in both private and public law.30 Most of that
work focuses on individuals rather than institutions.31 Its extension to
institutions raises complex evaluative puzzles. For example, it is not
immediately clear what it means to say that a corporate entity ‘feels’
coerced. Nor is it clear that there is any way of determining when an
institution has been ‘wronged’ by a coordinate institution’s promise or
threat, such that the latter counts as coercive.32 My argument does not
depend on contestable claims about institutional psychology or the rights of
corporate entities. Instead, I develop in what follows a broadly welfarist
account of the boundaries to permissible bargains based on the likely effects
of such bargaining upon values the Constitution aims to promote, including
democratic accountability and the provision of national public goods.
B.

Individual Bargaining in Theory and Practice
1.

Bargaining in Private Law

In private law contexts, bargaining is typically viewed as a desirable
mechanism for realizing social welfare gains. Starting with Ronald Coase,
law and economics scholars have argued that a resource will be assigned to
its highest value use via private ordering in the absence of transaction
costs.33 “Assuming parties are rational,” the theory suggests, they will trade
until a resource is assigned to its highest value use, and then “agre[e] upon
29

Cf. Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 295, 297 (1987).
30
See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79
(1981); Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440 (Sidney
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).
31
For an exception, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional
Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L. J. 1 (2001).
32
In recent work, Professor Berman has developed the possibility that institutions can be
compelled, even if they lack the requisite psychological states to fairly be described as
being coerced, because legal actors may have legal or moral duties toward institutions. See
Mitchell N. Berman, Conditional Spending and the (General) Conditional Offer Puzzle
(2013) (manuscript on file with author). Even if Berman’s claim about duties toward
institutions is correct, I do not assume here any exogenously given account of such duties.
Rather my aim is to develop that account from first principles.
33
Coase, supra note 14, at 8; accord Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1097.
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terms that maximize their joint surplus.”34 Given bargaining’s welfare
enhancing effects, scholars posit that states should strive to create and
administer property entitlements and enforcement regimes to facilitate
bargaining.35 This often entails an inquiry into how law should craft
interests—e.g., as property or liability rules36—to maximize welfare.37 In
structural constitutional law, however, where most interests are protected
with property rules rather than liability rules, this is not the best place to
begin an inquiry.38 Instead, I propose starting with a second, more relevant
line of private-law scholarship concerning the reasons for prohibiting
bargains.39 That work provides a basic framework for thinking about the
limits to autochthonic ordering in public law contexts.
Within the dominant welfarist approach to private bargaining, limits
to freedom of contracting are usually justified based on either the presence
34

Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
396, 397 (2009).
35
For the classic statement, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making
Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J. L. & ECON. S77, S95 (2011) [hereinafter “Merrill
& Smith, Coasean Property”] (“[P]roperty rights assume the form they do in significant
part to conserve on transaction costs.”).
36
See supra note 16 (defining property rules and liability rules).
37
See Ian Ayres, Valuing Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L. J. 881, 891 (2003) (“In
models with incomplete information, the efficiency loss of choosing an inefficient rule can
greatly exceed the nominal private costs of contracting around a default.”); Robert C.
Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L. J. 611, 624 (1989)
(explaining that “the prime normative objective should be to minimize the sum of
transaction costs and deadweight losses” due to insurmountable transaction costs). But see
Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 YALE L. J. 829, 834 (2003) (noting in the contract law context that
“determinate models omit important variables, but including these variables makes them
indeterminate, or, in some cases, unrealistic, because they place too great a burden on
courts”).
38
This is not to say that the choice between property and liability rules is irrelevant. For
example, the Court’s commandeering doctrine might be understood as motivated by a
preference for a property rule over a politically enforced liability rule. See Roderick Hills,
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and
“Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 817 (1998) [hereinafter “Hills,
Cooperative Federalism”] (arguing that “the federal government should not confiscate the
property or conscript the services of nonfederal governments … [but] should purchase such
services through a voluntary intergovernmental agreement”).
39
This is also a literature that examines non-welfarist justifications for limiting private
bargaining. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1907
(1987) (developing a “personhood” theory of inalienability); accord Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 17, at 932–33. Deontological values of the kind Radin marshals do not translate
well into the institutional context.
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of a negative externality or a recognized species of paternalism.40 First,
“contracts are optimal … only if the contracting parties bear the full costs of
their decisions and reap all the gains.”41 But when there are “adverse effects
on third parties,” i.e., externalities, the presumption of optimality fails.42
Under standard welfarist assumptions,43 the default response to an
externality is to require the “internalizing [of] the externality through fees or
taxes, [or] subsidizing the provision of information.”44 Mandatory terms are
deployed only when these fail. For example, it has been argued that
negative externalities can justify the absolute prohibitions of usury law,
which prevents overconsumption of social security.45 Neither fees nor
disclosure solve this externality. Only a mandatory rule will work.
The second exception, paternalism, is a more fluid concept.46
Loosely defined, paternalism is the law’s “intervention in a person’s

40

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1111–15 (also noting that distributional motives
may lie behind asserted paternalistic reasons); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 938;
accord Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 88 (1989). Michael Trebilcock offers a broader
range of exceptions, but includes paternalism and externalities. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK,
THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58–77, 147–163 (1993).
41
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1436 (1989). Some scholars also point to distributive goals as justifications for limits
on bargaining. See, e.g., id. at 1434 (noting the possibility that regulations can be
mechanisms for “income transfer”). Distributive justifications can be reframed as concerns
about the distribution of social power. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 571–72 (1982) (“The decision maker
operating from distributive motives changes the groundrules so as to change the balance of
power between the various groups in civil society.”). Even framed in terms of power,
distributive arguments have no safe perch in the structural constitutional context absent
some agreement about which institution needs empowerment.
42
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 41, at 1436. Externalities can also be defined in
relation to the competitive equilibrium resulting from a Walrasian auction. TREBILCOCK,
supra note 40, at 59.
43
I set aside here the hard question of what counts as an adverse externality in private law.
See TREBILCOCK, supra note 40, at 61–64.
44
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 938.
45
Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom To Contract, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 283 (1995).
46
Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L. J. 763, 765
(1983) (“It would be a mistake … to assume there is a single principle that best explains
every paternalistic restriction in our law of contracts ….”).
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freedom aimed at furthering her own good.”47 Its etiologies are diverse.
Paternalists search for internalities, or “problems of self-control and errors
in judgment that harm the people who make those very judgments.
[I]nternalities … occur[r] when we make choices that injure our future
selves.”48 A large literature mines behavioral law and economics for such
internalities.49 Another related literature asks how individual preferences
should be “laundered” to eliminate adaptive and otherwise distorted
preferences.50 Obviously, paternalism arguments based on individual
“human behavior” or “human error”51 cannot be directly transposed to the
institutional context. Errors that infect individual decision-making may not
occur in collective decision-making. Other internalities, however, do not
rely on theories of human psychology. For example, paternalism in contract
law may rest on accounts of second-order preferences, or preferences over
preferences.52 Mutatis mutandi, the idea of second-order preferences might
be extended to the institutional context. For example, an institutional
interest held common by a group of individuals—say, several states or
numerous legislators—might be degraded by free-riding. When a
collectivity suffers from this sort of collective action dilemma, intervention
might be justified to solve the ensuing ‘internality.’
The private law approach to bargaining, in short, is simple. A
permissible default position is combined with exclusionary rules when
triggered by negative externalities and paternalism-warranting internalities.

47

Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 236 (1998); see also
TREBILCOCK, supra note 40, at 147 (asking whether “parties present preferences” equate to
“their own best interests”).
48
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L. J. 1826, 1844–
45 (2013) [hereinafter “Sunstein, Behavioral Economics”]. One example is limits on crosscollateralization in consumer contracts, barred because purchasers tend to discount their
likelihood of default. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 139 (2013).
49
For a summary of the relevant literature, see generally Sunstein, supra note 48, at
passim; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
50
See Robert Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY 81–86 (J. Elster & A. Hylland eds. 1989) (listing five potential grounds for
laundering preferences). For a careful analysis of the relevance of adaptive preferences to
rational-choice consequentialism, see Jon Elster, Sour grapes—utilitarianism and the
genesis of wants, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 219 (A. Sen & B. Williams, eds. 1982).
51
Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1832.
52
Zamir, supra note 47, at 242.
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2.

Bargaining over Individual Constitutional Rights

Bargaining over constitutional rights raises issues absent from the
private law context. Constitutional law is characterized by pervasive
worries about government infringement on individual choice.53 Worries
about unequal bargaining power that might be diffuse in the private
contracting context54 come into crisp focus when one party’s wealth is
sourced through taxes on the other party.55 Government also possesses a
monopoly on the use of legitimate force that allows it to bargain not merely
with dollars,56 but also under the shadow of licit coercion. Wielding either
the purse or the sword, government can use its overwhelming resources to
“divide and conquer”57 potential adversaries among civil society, thereby
degrading important political liberties.
Nevertheless, the basis framework developed in private-law contexts
can be discerned in the complex jurisprudence concerning bargaining over
individual rights. The Court has developed two sets of rules for noncriminal
and criminal procedural rights respectively. In both domains, bargaining is
generally permitted with exceptions roughly tracking the externalities and
paternalism exceptions.
Consider first the rules for noncriminal contexts. When government
offers money in exchange for the exercise or nonexercise of a constitutional
right (e.g., speech), it can purchase the latter in the same way it can buy any
other good.58 Government thus routinely purchases private speech.59 It

This is the lesson of state action doctrine. Cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State
Action,” Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70
(1967) (“It is not too much to have said that the state action problem is the most important
problem in American law.”).
54
In economic terms, bargaining power depends on plural factors, including bargaining
procedures, parties’ relative costs of delay and relative patience, outside options, and more.
MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS 50–55 (1990).
55
Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1296 (“The greatest force of a modern government lies in its
power to regulate access to scarce resources.”).
56
See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
78 (Hans Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds.) (1948).
57
See Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier & Adrian Vermeule, Divide and Conquer, 2 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 417, 426–27 (2010) (modeling divide and conquer strategies as, inter
alia, a Stag Hunt game, and explaining how third-party bribes can yield suboptimal
outcomes for participants).
58
See, e.g., United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003)
(plurality opinion); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 (1991).
53
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cannot, however, purchase supererogatory “conditions that seek to leverage
funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”60
This limit on contractual conditions might be explained by a worry about
“the indoctrinating effect of a monopolized marketplace of ideas” created
when government buys out vocal participants through conditional
funding—i.e., it is a limit motivated by concern about negative
externalities.61 A different rule applies in Taking Clause cases. Imposing
regulatory exactions, the state may extract only conditions with “an
essential nexus and rough proportionality” to the “impacts of a proposed
development.”62 The limit to regulatory takings is sometimes justified by
vague grumbling about “extortionate” government action.63 It is more
cogently explained by a concern that landowners as a group cannot resist
government “extortio[n]” through the political process, because individually
they are vulnerable to “divide and conquer” tactics.64 This is an argument
from paternalism-warranting internalities.
Different rules apply to bargaining over criminal procedure
entitlements.65 The Court has tended to police “mistake or overt

59

This usually is addressed through the government speech doctrine. See, e.g., Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U.S. 550
(2005). Government can also effectively purchase the Fourth Amendment rights of
government employees. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
Government likely cannot purchase religious observance.
60
Agency for Intern. Development v. Alliance for Open Society Intern., Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2321, 2328 (2013).
61
David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 680 (1992).
62
Koontz v. St Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013); accord Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
63
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2549–50.
64
See Posner, Spier & Vermeule, supra note 57, at 426–27 (modeling divide and conquer
strategies as, inter alia, a Stag Hunt game, and explaining how third-party bribes can yield
suboptimal outcomes for participants).
65
The regulation of bargaining over criminal penalties, however, must be distinguished
from the possibility of unilateral waivers, which have become increasingly frequent. See,
e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (Alito, J., plurality op.) (holding that
suspects must expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment in noncustodial interrogations to
preclude later use of silence in criminal trial); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250,
2260 (2012) (holding in the context of post-Miranda silence that a defendant failed to
invoke his Fifth Amendment right to cut off police questioning when he remained silent for
two hours and 45 minutes).
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deception”66 but otherwise assumes that pleas reflect Pareto-optimal
compromises.67 Hence, threats by prosecutors to bring charges that would
not otherwise be lodged render a plea “no less voluntary than any other
bargained-for exchange.”68 Recent shifts in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, however, narrow that gap by imposing new obligations
related to defense-side representation in plea bargaining.69 These new Sixth
Amendment rules have been justified as correcting a flawed assumption that
“good information” on defendants’ part generally enabled them to
“rationally forecas[t] probabilities” of conviction and sentences.70 The new
rules instead reflect the reality that defendants will rarely be fully informed,
but rather plagued by internalities of “psychological biases and
heuristics.”71 Hence, in the criminal context, like noncriminal contexts,
constraints on bargaining with the state are grounded on internalities
concerns.
*

*

*

This brief survey of bargaining over individual rights reveals a
parallel basic architecture in both private and public law: An affirmative
default rule is fenced in concerns about by third-party externalities and
paternalism. In the institutional context, paternalist justifications include the
desire to protect collective entities from their own inability to overcome the

66

William Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 763 (1989);
see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619 (1998).
67
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L. J. 1969, 1970–
71 (1992).
68
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (1987) (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,
508 (1984)). Criminal procedure rights are thus less protected than other rights. Rachel
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1045–46
(2006).
69
See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
can be violated by counsel’s advice to reject a plea deal if a trial leads to a worse outcome);
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has
the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and
conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1478 (2010) (requiring advice about the immigration consequences of pleas).
70
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (2011).
71
Id. Another internalities-based argument against plea bargaining suggests that
prosecutors exploit a collective action problem among defendants to secure convictions on
charges defendants would never have faced in the first instance. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri
Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 737, 743
(2009).
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transaction costs of group action. The question now is whether these basic
insights can be translated over to the structural constitutionalism context.
II.

The Varieties of Institutional Bargaining

The Constitution vests a rich menu of institutional entitlements in
the branches of the federal government and the several states. Dynamic
interaction between these institutions creates opportunities for bargains in
which an entitlement held initially by one institution is voluntarily
transferred to another institution to realize a policy benefit. Intermural
bargaining occurs between Congress and the executive over elements of the
national lawmaking process. States and the federal government, by contrast,
negotiate over regulatory jurisdiction (i.e., the power to set rules for a
certain population) and the enforcement-related infrastructure. By
taxonomizing observed bargains, this Part demonstrates that voluntary dealmaking over institutional entitlements is a pervasive feature of the current
constitutional dispensation. This motivates the normative analysis of Parts
III and IV.
A.

Bargaining Between Branches
1.

The Constitution’s Allocation of Lawmaking Interests

Article I of the Constitution partitions lawmaking power between
the two Houses of Congress—each has the right to a separate vote on a
bill—and the President—he or she has the right to sign, veto, or pocket veto
that enrolled bill.72 Article II contains no explicit grant of legislative-like
authorities73 (although presidents do exercise de facto decree power74). This
asymmetry is amplified in the fiscal domain. To begin with, revenue-raising
measures must “originate” in the House of Representatives, not the
Senate.75 Executive fiscal authority is also tightly limited. Absent an

72

U.S. CONST. art. 1, §7, cl.2.
Where the President’s constitutional authority seems at an apogee, the Constitution’s text
cuts in the other direction. Hence, even if the President is “Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States,” U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl.1, Congress still can make
“Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” Art. I, §8, cl.14.
74
See Brian R. Sala, In Search of the Administrative President: Presidential ‘Decree’
Powers and Policy Implementation in the United States, in EXECUTIVE DECREE
AUTHORITY 254-73 (John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1998).
75
U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl.1.
73
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“[a]ppropriato[n] made by Law,” the Treasury cannot disburse funds.76
Military appropriations also cannot last more than two years.77 The
Constitution thus reposes the “‘power of the purse’ … in the Congress”
alone, with particular care to ensure legislative control over military power
that (to eighteenth-century eyes) might provide a basis for plenary executive
control.78 Pursuant to this authority, Congress created in 1974 a complex set
of procedures79 for discretionary and direct spending organized around its
longstanding committee structures.80
What the Constitution proposes, though, politicians dispose.
Observed deviations from the text’s modular disposition are typically
“consensual arrangements among the branches, not unilateral action by one
branch.”81 When these deals are challenged in federal court, the ensuing
jurisprudence illuminates the landscape of interbranch bargaining over
structural entitlements.82
2.

Bargaining over Rulemaking Authority

For more than a century after the Constitution’s ratification, the
textual division of law-making authority between Congress and the
President endured without much controversy. As late as 1892, the Supreme
U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl.7 (also requiring regular publication of “a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money”); see also 31 U.S.C.
§§ 1341(a), 1350 (2006) (imposing criminal penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment
and $5,000 in fines upon federal officials engaging in the knowing expenditure of funds
absent a legislative appropriation). The President’s authority to issue new debt is
constrained by statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing the statutory
debt limit), amended by Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240.
77
U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl.12.
78
Kenneth W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 278
(1977).
79
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 and 31 U.S.C.).
80
See Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95
GEO. L. J. 1555, 1563, 1568–80 (2007) (describing current congressional budgeting
structures).
81
Jacob R. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 356 (2010).
82
In addition to the species of bargaining discussed below, it is possible to think of statutes
amending the House’s or the Senate’s internal procedures as an interbranch bargain.
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes To Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment,
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346–47
(2003) (describing “statutized rules”). Bruhl analyzes these bargains in light of
entrenchment concerns. Id. at 372–76 (anticipating my analysis of negative externalities);
see infra Part IV.A.
76
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Court could assume that no interbranch delegation of such legislative
authority was permissible.83 An “intelligible principle” was required to
guide any exercise of executive branch discretion.84 Although the Court
permitted executive clarification of statutes through rulemaking by the early
twentieth century,85 it remained committed to the nondelegation doctrine. In
1935, the Justices invalidated two early New Deal regulatory regimes on
nondelegation grounds.86 In effect, Article I entitlements were protected
with an inalienability rule.
Since 1935, however, the Court has permitted Congress and the
executive to negotiate broad delegations of rulemaking authority to federal
administrative agencies. Delegation is now “the dynamo of modern
government.”87 The political branches conspire in “virtually complete
abandonment” of nondelegation constraints.88 Even scholars critical of this
development perceive “no serious real-world legal or political challenges”
to it.89 Now, “there just is no constitutional nondelegation rule” and
whispers thereof are “nothing more than a local aberration.”90 As a result,
“[t]he bulk of our federal law now derives from agency rules, guidances,
opinion letters, manuals, and websites.”91 Litigated efforts to rekindle the
nondelegation doctrine sputter.92 In a limited number of cases, to be sure,

Marshall Field & Co v Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution.”).
84
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
85
See, e.g., United States v Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911) (“(T)he authority to make
administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power.”).
86
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
87
LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 33 (1965).
88
See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1241 (1994).
89
Id. Justice Thomas, however, has indicated his willingness to “reconsider [the Court’s]
precedents on cessions of legislative power.” Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531
U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
90
Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1721, 1722 (2002).
91
Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1727, 1730 (2010); accord Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum,
41 DUKE L. J. 1463, 1469 (1992).
92
See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222–23 (1989) (finding
“no support . . . for [the] contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices of
Congress require the application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases
83
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the Court imposes “nondelegation canons,” but these tend to enforce
discrete values such as federalism and individual rights external to Article
I.93 What once was subject to an inalienability rule is now regulated through
a property rule.94
The ensuing transfer of Article I authority was amplified in 1983
with Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in which the
Court invoked expertise and democratic accountability grounds to defer to
some executive-branch interpretations of ambiguous statutes.95 Provided a
statute adequately signals congressional intent to vest the executive with
gap-filling authority, delegation is packaged post-Chevron with new-rulemaking authority.96 Indeed, even a “general delegation to the agency to
administer the statute will often satisfy the court that Congress has
delegated interpretive authority over the ambiguity at issue.”97 Chevron
deference matters here because one important way for Congress to control
ex post executive branch policy-making is by constructing “fire alarms for
constituents to sound when wronged by bureaucrats…. Congress gives
private groups standing to challenge administrative decisions.”98 Judicial
deference to agency interpretations renders this strategy less effective.
Courts operating within a deferential regime are less likely to heed “fire
alarms” sounded by private citizens. Chevron therefore not only transfers

where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing
power”); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (same for criminal statutes).
93
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
94
When Congress overrides a presidential veto to delegate authority to the federal
government, it is hard to describe the outcome as consensual. Delegation instead is a
(legitimately) forced transfer.
95
467 U.S. 837, 843, 865 (1984) (arguing that because “[j]udges are not experts in the
field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government,” they should defer to
reasonable agency rules unless Congress has directly spoken to the issue).
96
See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (identifying
this threshold problem as “Chevron Step Zero”).
97
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1884 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
accord id. at 1871 (Scalia, J., majority op.). But judicial deference is not stably allocated.
See Jud Matthews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1352–53 (2013) (arguing
that administrative agencies face a “‘deference lottery’ when they advance a statutory
interpretation in a notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication”).
98
See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). When an agency’s
ideal point is closer to Congress’s than private litigants’, judicial deference does not
undermine congressional control.
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Article I rule-making authority, but also handicaps an important instrument
of legislative control.99
The demise of the nondelegation doctrine hence enabled an
intragovernment market for law-making authority. Once, if Congress could
not overcome its own veto-gates and attain policy outcomes by specifying
those preferences in textual form first to be engrossed, then enrolled, it was
out of luck. Now, Congress has another option: it can bargain with the
executive over an open-ended delegation of rulemaking authority coupled to
vague goals as a way to achieve policy change.100 Dollars may not be the
coin of this marketplace, but it nonetheless has a transactional character.
Congress is not merely waiving its Article I prerogatives. It is engaged in
deliberate and reciprocal deals in which legislative authority is alienated in
order to secure policy goods legislators could not otherwise obtain.
Delegation is a negotiated deal, in short, in which power is traded for
discretion.
Alternatively, interbranch transfers of regulatory authority are
achieved through customary interbranch accords. In military and foreign
affairs matters, the Court permits unilateral executive action based not only
on a present legislative delegation, but also on prior congressional action.
The Court has held that a historical interbranch consensus can operate as a
“gloss” on ambiguous Constitution text.101 In Dames & Moore v. Regan, for
example, the Court endorsed executive power to create unilaterally a
supranational claims tribunal through an agreement with Iran on the ground
that previous “Congress[es] ha[d] implicitly approved the practice.”102 The
holding rested on the principle that “a practice by one branch of government
99

Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1749, 1769 (2007) (observing that “fire-alarm” oversight “is efficient because it
shifts to third-parties the cost of gathering and processing information”).
100
See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST APPROACH TO POLICY-MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 197 (1999) (arguing that
as the complexity, difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specificity rise, legislators
will tend more and more to delegate decisions rather than resolving hard questions
themselves).
101
See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (relying on “historical
glosses” on executive power); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (citing the
absence of historical practice as one ground for denying congressional standing).
102
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680, 686 (1981); accord Jefferson Powell,
Essay, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 539 (1999) (“Agreement between the political branches on a
course of conduct is important evidence that the conduct should be deemed
constitutional.”).
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that implicates the prerogatives of another branch gains constitutional
legitimacy only if the other branch can be deemed to have ‘acquiesced’ in
the practice over time.”103 More recently, the D.C. Circuit relied on “postratification” practice to hold that Presidents have exclusive power to
recognize foreign sovereigns.104 Like formal interbranch transfers of
authority, the theory of historical gloss is a theory of interbranch
agreements. It is not a constitutional analog to adverse possession. But the
operative concept of agreement is ambiguous.105 As a result, the historical
gloss doctrine diminishes Congress’s leverage. It creates the possibility that
acquiesced-in delegations will not be accompanied by reciprocal gains for
legislators.106
A different regime, however, applies when an interbranch bargain
slices up the law-making entitlement into something other than a cognizable
delegation. In two notable cases, the Court has resisted new permutations of
law-making authority by imposing inalienability rules. Its resistance echoes
the private law numerus clausus principle, which directs that real property
rights conform to certain standardized forms.107
The legislative veto is an instructive example. The idea of reserving
a veto to either one or both Houses did not germinate on Capitol Hill, but
“originated because presidents wanted it…. Presidents asked Congress to
delegate additional authority and were willing to accept the legislative veto

103

Curtis Bradley & Trevor Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 432 (2012).
104
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, -- F.3d --, 2013 WL 3799663, at *12 (D.C.
Cir. Jul. 23, 2013).
105
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 103, at 433–38 (canvassing various possible
meanings of “acquiescence”).
106
By analogy with custom, it could be argued that the scope of federal court jurisdiction is
“the subject of an ongoing dialogue between [Congress and the judiciary].” Barry
Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction,
85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990). Indeed, in the course of the serial opinions over
jurisdiction-stripping legislation respecting the Guantánamo detentions, the Court referred
to itself as embedded within an “ongoing dialogue between and among the branches of
Government.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008). Whether the outcome of this
“dialogue” reflects the preferences of all branches, however, is quite another question. Cf.
Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMM. 385, 402–05 (2010) (presenting
empirical evidence to the effect that Supreme Court intervention in military detentions at
Guantánamo has failed to have any significant libertarian effect).
107
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 4 (2000) (noting that numerus clausus
means“the number is closed”).
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that controlled the delegation.”108 President Herbert Hoover, seeking broad
authority from Congress to reorganize the federal executive, first proposed a
legislative veto, and secured one in 1933 reorganization legislation.109
Legislative vetoes were then incorporated into “hundreds” of statutes as the
price of legislative delegations.110 So indispensable did it become that in the
sixteen months after the device’s judicial repudiation, Congress still enacted
fifty-three legislative vetoes.111
INS v. Chadha was the occasion for the Court’s invalidation of the
legislative veto.112 It arose out of deportation proceedings in which the
House of Representatives had exercised a legislative veto to evacuate relief
from deportation granted to six noncitizens.113 Chief Justice Burger
reasoned that the House veto was “essentially legislative in purpose and
effect” because it “had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties and relations of persons,” and hence could only be valid if passed
through bicameralism and presentment.114 Scholars quickly condemned the
decision’s formalist character115 and noted that it failed to recognize the
realities of delegation in the post-New Deal regulatory state.116
Like the legislative veto, the line-item veto also endeavored to
rearrange lawmaking authority between the branches. Unlike the legislative
veto, but like delegation, it moved a quantum of congressional authority to
the President. The 1994 Line Item Veto Act allowed the President to cancel
“(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of
new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.”117 Like the legislative
veto, the line-item veto was a voluntary deal. It was proposed by the branch
that lost power (Congress) at a time the other branch was led by a political

108

Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 273, 273–74 (1993).
109
Id. at 278–79.
110
William West & Joseph Cooper, The Congressional Veto and Administrative
Rulemaking, 98 POL. SCI. Q. 285, 286 (1983).
111
Louis Fisher, Judicial Misjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative
Veto Case, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705, 706 (1985).
112
462 U.S. 919, 930−31 (1983).
113
Id. at 926–27.
114
Id. at 951–52 (op. of Burger, C.J.).
115
See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 250
(2007).
116
See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 88, at 1252–53.
117
2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III).
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foe.118 Legislators were under no illusions about what they had renounced.
“Make no mistake about it,” prophesized Republican Sen. Jon Kyl (a
supporter of the proposal), a line item veto “will shift a great deal of new
power to … President [Clinton].” 119 The policy good that Sen. Kyl and
others received in exchange for alienating some of their Article I authority
was a potential solution to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ problems facing the
federal fisc. In this dynamic, each legislator wishing to maintain federal
budgetary integrity but also shirking their role in the hope that other
legislators would take up the slack.120
In Clinton v. City of New York, the Court invalidated the line-item
veto on formalist grounds similar to Chadha’s.121 Writing for the Court,
Justice Stevens reasoned from the Presentment Clause to conclude that
“constitutional silence” about unilateral Presidential action repealing or
amending parts of duly enacted statutes should be “construe[d] … as
equivalent to an express prohibition.”122 Clinton installed a distinction
between “cancellation and modification delegations on the one hand and the
familiar lawmaking delegations.”123 That is, Congress can alienate
regulatory authority but not fiscal authority. It is not clear the distinction is
cogent. When Congress delegates regulatory discretion, it necessarily vests
the executive with some discretion over the costs of administration and the
enforcement of fines. Indeed, Justice Scalia in his Clinton v. City of New
York dissent reasoned that Congress could achieve substantially the same
effect as a line-item veto by alternative means; he thus condemned the
Court for being “fak[ed] out” by the Act’s title.124
118

It was the newly elected Republican House majority in 1994 that proposed and pushed
the line item veto, which most immediately empowered President Clinton. Elizabeth
Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and The Line Item Veto
Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 872 (1999) [hereinafter “Garrett, Accountability and
Restraint”]. This was not the first time a line item veto had been proposed in Congress. See
Alan Morrison, The Line Item Veto: Both Parties Want It, but Is It Constitutional? Yes:
Unbundling Omnibus Bills Won't Work, 81 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (1995). When Hoover first
proposed the legislative veto, by contrast, his fellow Republicans controlled both houses.
Id.
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142 Cong. Rec. S2978 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, at 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 892,
892 (stating that the Act was intended to help reduce “run-away federal spending and a
rising national debt”).
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Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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Id. at 439.
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Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1, 4–5 (1998).
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Clinton, 524 U.S. at 468-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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3.

Bargaining over Fiscal Authority

Congress and the President have agreed on a series of legislative
enactments that move substantial fiscal authority between chambers and
across the interbranch divide.125 Some of these deals have been durable,
others evanescent. Each embodies a negotiated reallocation of the fiscal
authorities initially assigned by Article I of the Constitution.
Consider first shifting entitlements between legislative chambers.
The Origination Clause allocates first-mover rights on fiscal matters to the
House. But the Senate often “takes a revenue bill passed by the House …
strikes the language of the bill entirely, and replaces it with its own revenue
bill unrelated to the one that began in the House.”126 Further, the House
lacks a constitutional role in drafting or enactment revenue-raising tax
treaties, but these “have become an important and frequently used
coordination device between countries, with the United States entering into
nearly seventy such instruments.”127 Through inattention or acquiescence,
the House’s role in fiscal agenda-setting has thus waned.
Negotiated reworkings of constitutional authority over the federal
fisc postdate World War I.128 In 1919, the House Appropriations Committee
established a Select Committee on the Budget that drafted a new
framework, one that “vested responsibility for the preparation of the budget
solely in the President and provided for the establishment in his office of a
Bureau of the Budget to give him technical assistance.”129 The ensuing
1921 law reallocated Congress’s right to set the fiscal agenda to the
President.130 The executive also gained authority to identify the baseline
125

See William G. Dauster, The Congressional Budget Process, in FISCAL CHALLENGES:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH to Budget Policy 6–15 (E. Garrett et al. eds., 2008).
126
Rebecca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause. 91
WASH. U. L. REV. – (forthcoming 2014) (draft at 3), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271261.
127
Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2–
3 (2013); id. at 29–31 (arguing that the Origination Clause should be read as a constraint on
the Treaty Power to preserve the House’s role in fiscal matters).
128
For the pre-twentieth century history, see id. at 5–6; see also Kate Stith, Congress’
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L. J. 1343, 1364-77 (1988) (discussing the two major pieces
of nineteenth century framework legislation to exercise control over budgeting).
129
PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN E. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
323 (2d ed. 1963).
130
See Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, tit. II, 42 Stat. 20, 20-23
(granting greater budgetary powers to the President), amended by Reorganization Act of
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against which proposed fiscal changes are measured.131 The executive’s
agenda-setting authority is further amplified by an implicit delegation
bundled into most appropriations measures. Congress no longer enacts lineby-line appropriations targeting discrete offices, but parcels out funds in
agency-specific lump-sums denominated in the millions to hundreds of
millions of dollars.132 As a result, the President wields large influence on
the intragovernmental and geographic distributions of federal dollars.133
Executive dominance of budgeting is not immutable. Between 1990
and 2002, for example, budgeting operated under the “PAYGO rules”
negotiated between President George H.W. Bush and Congress, which
required that a class of new tax cuts and spending programs be funded via
revenue offsets.134 When Congress failed to offset new covered spending,
the President was empowered to issue a mandatory sequestration order.135
PAYGO, however, expired in 2002, and has not since been renewed,
ratcheting back the scope of authority delegated to the executive.136

1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, §201, 53 Stat. 561, 565 (expanding the President's budgetary
control to include “any regulatory commission or board”). The suasive effect of the
President’s budget, nevertheless, is debated. See Dauster, supra note 125, at 17 (“Congress
can and often does treat the president’s budget as just so many suggestions.”).
131
For instance, after the enactment of temporary tax cuts, President George W. Bush
proposed that those cuts be treated as permanent for subsequent budgeting purposes such
that these extensions would be recorded as budget neutral. See Rebecca Kysar, Lasting
Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1028 (2011).
132 See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-RudmanHollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 611 (1988) (noting that “appropriations legislation
has generally contained less line-item detail than it did in the preceding 150 years
[and] appropriations acts fund each broadly defined federal program or activity in
one lump sum, termed a budget ‘account’”). The use of lump-sum appropriations
remains the norm in current and pending appropriations measures. See, e.g., An Act
Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense and the Other Departments
and Agencies of the Government for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2011, and
for Other Purposes, H.R. 1, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr1eh.pdf.
133
See Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, The President and the
Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 783, 786 (2010).
134
See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 507–14 (1998) (describing PAYGO).
135
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-580, tit. XIII, §13101,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-574 to 1388-583 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §900-903 (2000)).
136
For an evaluation of PAYGO, see Elizabeth Garrett, A Fiscal Constitution With
Supermajority Voting Rules, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 471, 481 (1999).
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The Court has been largely absent from these negotiations.137 Its
only significant judicial intervention was Bowsher v. Synar, which
invalidated elements of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985.138 This statute allocated sequestration authority to the
Comptroller-General, who the Court found to be an agent of Congress.139
Deploying a formalist logic parallel to Chadha’s, Chief Justice Burger
explained that this allocation of sequestration authority “plac[ed] the
responsibility for execution of the [law] in the hands of an officer who is
subject to removal only by … Congress,” which “in effect … retained
control over the execution of the Act and … intruded into the executive
function.”140 Later cases gloss Bowsher in terms of a functionalist concern
about congressional self-aggrandizement.141 Indeed, Congress reacted to
Bowsher by delegating sequestration authority to the (executive-branch)
Office of Management and Budget.142 But Bowsher, like Chadha and
Clinton, can equally be understood in terms of a constitutional numerus
clausus principle: Congress can delegate fiscal discretion wholesale, but it
cannot unbundle that discretion to reserve a meaningful veto at the margin.
B.

Bargaining between the States and the Federal Government

The Constitution bifurcates regulatory jurisdiction between the
several states and the federal government. Efforts to police the ensuing line
occupy an inordinate share of judicial bandwidth.143 Despite the vigor and
persistence of judicial invigilation, however, the federal–state border is still
characterized by vigorous trading. This section documents diverse forms of
regulatory exchange between the federal government and the states to
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In 1975, the Court declined to find implied presidential impoundment authority without
statutory authorization. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 44−46 (1975). This
occurred at a time of great political controversy over President Nixon’s employment of
impoundment, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE PRESIDENT 133−34 (4th ed. 1997), and so might be tallied in the ranks of judicial
intrusions into fiscal institutional design. The Court has allowed private litigants to bring
Origination Clause challenges, but adopted a narrow view of the Clause’s reach. United
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1990).
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2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-922 (West Supp. 1986).
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Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986).
140
Id. at 734.
141
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 684–85 (1988).
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Dauster, supra note 125, at 11.
143
For a survey of relevant doctrine, see Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated
Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 586–611 (2013).
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suggest that the common image of a static “federal balance”144 elides
operational realities.
1.

The Constitution’s Distribution of Regulatory Powers

The Constitution’s central strategy for dividing federal and state
domains hinges on the textual enumeration of national governmental
authorities.145 This strategy is less successful than the Constitution’s
interbranch allocation of responsibilities over law-making. Due to the
constitutional text’s underspecification and ambiguity, judicial
responsibility for drawing the margins of national authority has taken on
large significance.146 With great responsibility, however, comes great
divisiveness. The Justices not only differ on how to construe the
Constitution’s grants of national power, but also on how to read its general
rule of construction, which is contained in the Necessary and Proper
Clause.147 Divisive public and judicial disagreement about federalism may
be so pervasive that it might fairly be ranked as a distinctive, identifying
trait of American constitutionalism.
Federal regulatory power rests centrally on the Commerce Clause,
which licenses broad superintendence over the national economy and its
144

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See, e.g.,National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2576 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,) (“[R]ather than granting general authority to perform all
the conceivable functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal
Government's powers…. The Constitution's express conferral of some powers makes clear
that it does not grant others.”).
146
Cf. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence,
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM & MARY L REV. 1733, 1748–49 (2005) (“The
open-textured nature of the Constitution’s structural commitments calls for judicial
implementation through doctrine: There is simply no way to administer our federal system
without developing rules to flesh out the allocation and balance of authority.”). The era in
which it was plausible to imagine dual, mutually exclusive sovereignties is long passed.
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
147
For example, in United States v. Kebodeaux, seven Justices voted to uphold a civil
registration requirement for those who had been subject to conviction in a military court
martial before the enactment of the relevant registration statute, with four Justices
characterizing the case as straightforward. 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2502–05 (2013). Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito both concurred, registering disapproval of the majority’s method
for resolving the scope of Necessary and Proper-related powers. Id. at 2505–08 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring); id. at 2508–09 (Alito, J., concurring). Given that dissenting Justices
Scalia and Thomas offered slightly different accounts of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
it would seem that there are (at least) four different doctrinal accounts of that central
constitutional provision on the Court.
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constituent parts.148 Proper invocation of the Commerce Clause permits
Congress to preempt contrary state laws or regulations.149 This regulatory
jurisdiction is plenary if licitly exercised.150 When a federal law is presented
in state court, state judicial officials have no option but to respect the
federal preferences embodied therein.151 In addition to its enumerated
regulatory authorities, the national government also can draw on its power
to collect taxes and expend funds for “the common Defense and the general
Welfare,”152 a power unbounded by other restraints on national regulatory
authority.153 Congress can accordingly offer subsidies to subnational
governments upon the condition that they undertake other policies.
The Court has also imposed two significant constraints on the
deployment of most (but not all) enumerated powers that have the effect of
creating intergovernmental markets over regulation. First, when a federal
law singles out state legislative or executive officials with a legal obligation
that does not fall on private actors, it violates an “anti-commandeering”
principle.154 Because “[s]tate sovereignty is not just an end in itself,” but a
means to promoting individual liberty, the Court held that “departure[s]
from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state
officials.”155 Nevertheless, the federal government can “purchase the
U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States”).
149
For an introduction to the Court’s preemption jurisprudence, see Ernest A. Young, “The
Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court,
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253.
150
One example is a state law that is preempted is “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
151
See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that a Rhode Island state court must
entertain a federal claim arising under the Emergency Price Control Act); see also Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers
to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1027 (1995) (exploring the scope of
this obligation).
152
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.1.
153
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 718 n.1
(5th ed. 1891) (opining that Congress’s taxation and spending powers are“not limited … to
cases falling within specific powers enumerated in the Constitution”).
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See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-25 & n.13 (1997) (holding that “[o]ur
system of dual sovereignty” is incompatible with the commandeering of state executive
officials to implement the gun control and registration provisions of the Brady Bill); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (explaining that “the Constitution has
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern
[i.e., legislate] according to Congress' instructions”).
155
New York, 505 U.S. at 121–82.
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services of state and local government” in the same way it purchases private
services.156 Accordingly, state administrative capacities are subject to a
“modified property rule” under which the right may be sold, but not given
away.157
Second, glossing the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has directed
that the federal government cannot use any of its 1787 powers to oust
directly the states’ sovereign immunity from individual litigants’ damages
actions in state or federal court.158 Such ouster, however, is permitted under
the Reconstruction Amendments.159 Moreover, the federal government can
purchase compliance through a conditional grant to the states, provided that
the legislation in question articulates with heightened precision the scope of
the immunity waiver.160
Although explained as vindications of states’ rights, the anticommandeering and sovereign immunity doctrines both create property
rules rather than inalienability rules. That is, they do not immunize state
regulatory jurisdiction, but instead facilitate its trade. This contrasts sharply
with the Court’s approach in separation of powers jurisprudence, where
inalienability rules dominate. In the balance of this section, I accordingly
show how this basic framework is employed in intergovernmental
bargaining. First, I show that preemptive national laws can be sites for
bargaining both pre- and post-enactment. I then consider two special
cases—when a federal law is the result of interstate bargaining outside
Congress and cooperative federalism programs. Finally, I examine
conditional federal spending as a bargain.
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Hills, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 38, at 819.
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 947.
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See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress could not abrogate
the States’ immunity for suits in state court); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 54 (1996) (not allowing ouster of state sovereign immunity under Article I powers).
Oddly, bankruptcy is another exception. Central Va. Community Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S.
356 (2006).
159
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2.

Federal Law as Intergovernmental Bargain: Pre-enactment
and Post-Enactment Bargaining

Even though states have no formal voice in national lawmaking,161
federal laws still reflect the interests of both the federal government and the
several states. Rather than preemptively repudiating states’ sovereign
interests, in consequence, it is possible to rank some federal laws are the
outcomes of intergovernmental negotiation within Congress.
Even in the absence of any constitutional entitlement, states have
both a stake in and an influence on legislated bargains. States have an
incentive to participate in the federal legislative process because they stand
to gain when national public goods are realized. Alternatively, they might
seek federal legislation to muffle interstate competition and protect their
own inefficient rules.162 States’ voice in Congress is credible for four
reasons. First, state officials control access to electioneering and get-outthe-vote resources that are vital to federal politicians.163 Second, vocal
public opposition of state officials may be politically costly for federal
officials, making negotiation more desirable than confrontation. Third,
states’ governance infrastructure—while immune from direct federal
takeover as a consequence of the anti-commandeering rule164—may be
needed for operationalizing a law.165 There are also limits to what the
federal government can practically compel even when it does have legal
authority to dictate state action. For example, the 2005 REAL ID’s
mandatory federal standards for state-issued identification sparked protests
and ultimately noncompliance by states, ultimately forcing the Secretary of
Homeland Security to defer that final implementation.166 Finally, states can
force federal legislative action by forging ahead in a new policy domain
161

The Seventeenth Amendment eliminated the possibility of direct transmissions of
preferences between state and federal legislatures. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 17.
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Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L. J. 75, 110 (2001) (defining horizontal aggrandizement).
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Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
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See cases cited supra in note 154.
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Cf. Heather Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L. J. 2633, 2635 (2006)
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before the national government can act.167 In these ways, states set the
agenda and influence the contents of national law.
States further have institutional means to achieve such influence. An
important channel for such bargaining is states’ lobbying organizations.168
Since the turn of the twentieth century, states have cultivated a powerful
“intergovernmental lobby” of organizations such as the Council of State
Legislators and the National Governors’ Association to represent their
interests in Congress.169 This lobby ensures that states’ interests are at least
raised prior to a law’s enactment.170 The states’ lobby’s many successes171
include aspects of the Affordable Care Act that were modified to account
for states’ concerns.172
Nor need bargaining cease once federal law is enacted. Federal laws,
even when preemptive in general effect, sometimes assign property interests
to states allowing vetoes of federal regulatory efforts. For instance, the
Coastal Zone Management Act imposes a prerequisite of state certification
prior to any federally funded activity.173 The Federal Clean Water Act also
allows states to condition their certification of covered projects upon any
limitations deemed necessary by the state to ensure compliance with state
water quality standards.174
Such entitlements may be prophylaxis against anticipated
constitutional challenges. In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, for
example, the Court held that a provision of the National Voter Registration
167

See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. ECON & ORG. 313,
327, 330 (1985) (developing example of the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act of 1965).
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JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR
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Gravelle, How Federal Policymakers Account for the Concerns of State and Local
Governments in the Formulation of Federal Tax Policy, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 631, 631 (2007).
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See Samuel Beer, Political Overload and Federalism, 10 POLITY 5, 11 (1977)
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John P. Pelissero & Robert E. England, State and Local Governments’ Washington
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LOCAL GOV’T REV. 68, 68 (1987).
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Act (NVRA)175 requiring states to “accept and use” a federally produced
voter registration form preempted an Arizona statutory provision that
required proof of citizenship to register to vote by mail. 176 The Court
responded to Arizona’s argument that such preemption impinged upon its
sovereign authority to establish voting qualification by explaining that “no
constitutional doubt is raised” when an “alternative means of enforcing [the
state’s] constitutional power to determine voting qualifications remains
open to Arizona.”177 The Court noted that the NVRA allowed states to
petition the federal Election Assistance Commission to change the
mandated registration template.178 Post-enactment exercise of a statutory
veto, that is, mitigated federalism concerns. But a future federal failure to
respond to such a request, cautioned Justice Scalia pointedly, might lead to
a constitutional order.179 Hence, the state’s statutory entitlement under the
NVRA is rendered more credible, even necessary, by the shadow of
constitutional law.
3.

Federal Law as Intergovernmental Bargain: The Case of
Bargaining Outside The National Legislative Process

Intergovernmental negotiation need not occur within the precincts of
the national legislative process. Examination of the seminal anticommandeering case, New York v. United States,180 reveals that federal law
can emerge out of bargaining between states outside the Beltway. The
federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRWPA)181 imposed a
federal regime respecting the production and disposal of radioactive waste.
It sought to mitigate a status quo ante in which disposal sites were
concentrated in a handful of states, which threatened to close their facilities
175

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq.
133 S. Ct. 2247, 2251 (2013).
177
Id. at 2260.
178
Id. at 2259 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–7(a)(2)).
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Id. at 2260 n.10. A further wrinkle in the Inter Tribal case is that the Election Assistance
Commission lacked a quorum to function, and a concurrent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruling precluded the White House from using recess appointments to fill the post. See
Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 499–512 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert granted 2013 WL
1774240 (Jun 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281) (identifying U.S. Const. Art II, §2, cl. 3 as basis of
challenge). Hence, a seizure in interbranch bargaining may well lead to a breakdown in
intergovernmental bargaining—an example of entanglement between the two species of
negotiation discussed in this Part.
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505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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entirely.182 Its mandate “resulted from the efforts of state leaders to achieve
a state-based set of remedies to the waste problem.”183 The LLRWPA thus
was an intermural bargain between states to alienate a portion of their
regulatory suzerainty so as to solve a collective action problem. Application
of the anti-commandeering rule to negate this bargain did not serve the
interests of the states as against federal overreaching. Instead, it enabled one
state (New York) to continue imposing costs without internalizing a share
of the collective burden. New York, that is, could continue imposing costs
on others that were generally perceived as disproportionate or unfair.184
From this perspective, the Court’s choice to frame its analysis about the
question whether New York was “estop[ped]” from challenging its earlier
agreement as a violation of state sovereignty is question begging.185
This analysis suggests that a federal statute that ‘commandeers’ a
state’s executive or legislative process can have diverse explanations. On
the one hand, a federal law that engages in commandeering may be a
malignant effort by Congress to impose unfunded mandates on the states
while taking credit for downstream policy achievements.186 On the other
hand, commandeering may also be a signal that the states and the federal
government have reached a welfare-enhancing deal that solves collective
action problems among the several states.187 Such deals might build on what
the long history of federal legislative ratification of interstate deals in
territorial disputes.188 Hence, the anti-commandeering rule installed in New
York and Printz v. United States may have democratic and fiscal
Ryan, ‘Cathedral’, supra note 12, at 42.
New York, 505 U.S. at 189–90 (White, J., dissenting).
184
The LLRWPA, however, contained other punitive mechanisms that waste importing
states might have employed.
185
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has never been understood to estop the party from challenging that legislation in
subsequent litigation.”).
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federal subsidies. 521 U.S. 898, 914 n.7, 930 (1997).
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Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (1999).
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justifications (albeit only if the federal government cannot secure unfunded
mandates by other means189), but it also stifles a potent source of future
deal-makings among states and the national government.190
4.

Cooperative Federalism as Bargaining

Congress can employ its Article I, section 8 enumerated powers to
establish a “cooperative federalism” program. Narrowly defined,
cooperative federalism encompasses “programs in which the federal
government establishes minimum standards that states may opt to
implement through programs that are no less stringent.”191 In such
programs, “nonfederal governments help implement federal policy in a
variety of ways: by submitting implementation plans to federal agencies, by
promulgating regulations, and by bringing administrative actions to enforce
federal statutes.”192 Cooperative federalism programs “see[k] to exploit
economies of scale by establishing national … standards while leaving their
attainment to state authorities subject to federal oversight.”193 These efforts
are typically created through conditionally preempting legislation.194 State
agencies are invited, but not required, to participate.195 In effect, these deals
reflect the exercise of a modified liability rule vested in the federal
government: The latter can regulate directly if it pays the costs of
administration, or it can allow the state to maintain administrative primacy,
albeit in pursuit of federal aims.
189

See Siegel, supra note 187, at 1646–60 (exploring the existence of alternatives to
commandeering).
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Studies of cooperative federalism schemes suggest that despite its
preemptive authority, the national government does not hold all the cards.
Instead, “states can continue to exert influence through enforcement of
federal law.”196 The practical effect of the constitutional structure is to
assign to states a set of regulatory resources that can be leveraged to secure
shifts to federal policies. Most importantly, state governments tend to have
“local expertise [and] … boots on the ground [and] perceived legitimacy”
necessary for programs’ implementation that the federal government
lacks.197 Indeed, the federal government may be unable to achieve national
public goods without state officials’ voluntary cooperation.198 States also
use their monopoly on implementation resources to negotiate alternatives to
policy calibrations initially specified by the federal government. On one
view, “local tailoring” of this kind is a central benefit of cooperative
federalism.199 Some federal programs even formalize this possibility by
including explicit waiver provisions that allow state opt-outs from certain
conditions.200 For example, as of April 2013, thirty-three states had secured
waivers from 2002 No Child Left Behind mandates.201
Alternatively, states might deploy their discretionary authority under
cooperative federalism programs to adopt policies at odds with federal
goals.202 In one striking example from the early 1980s, Congress amended
the Social Security Act in June 1980 to compel increased scrutiny of
beneficiaries’ disability status—a priority of the Reagan Administration—
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703 (2011); see also Weiser, supra note 195, at 1732 (“[C]ooperative federalism statutes
give state agencies considerable discretion to address interstitial matters left open by
federal agencies.”).
197
Ryan, Negotiated Federalism, supra note 12, at 90.
198
Cf. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137, 2139
(2002) (noting federal need for state and local police).
199
Weiser, supra note 195, at 1699.
200
See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
265, 275–85 (2013) (providing examples of waiver provisions in cooperative federalism
programs concerning education and social welfare).
201
Id. at 280–81.
202
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.
J. 1258, 1281–82 (2009) (supplying examples); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in
Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 187–88 (1998) (narrating how
states obtained changes to federal welfare policy in the 1960s through resistance to
executive positions in Congress).

33

but state resistance brought the initiative to a halt.203 In this way, the
exercise of enforcement-related discretion can operate as a chip with which
states can bargain to influence and alter the direction of putatively
nationalized policies. Cooperative federalism is therefore properly viewed
as an invitation to, not an absolute ousting of, intergovernmental bargaining.
5.

Conditional Spending as Bargaining

Congress’s conditional spending power not only allows it to
purchase anti-commandeering and sovereign immunity entitlements, but
also to buy state legislation that cannot be preempted.204 Congress
commonly uses its spending power to offer states “bargains … in which the
federal government negotiates to extend its regulatory reach into zones
otherwise constitutionally reserved to the states.”205 To the extent the Court
recognizes policy “areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign,”206 such recognition marks
the beginning of intergovernmental negotiation, not its terminus.
Conditional spending legislation is “in the nature of a contract: in
return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions.”207 The 2002 No Child Left Behind, or NCLB, exemplifies such
an intervention into a domain of traditional state control.208 Notwithstanding
the take-it-or-leave-it character of spending power deals, states still possess
“unappreciated power” to resist the federal government.209 To begin with,
203
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states’ lobbies are actively involved in lobbying over the content of
conditional spending enactments, “asking for either … unconditional
grants… or grants with conditions that, as a practical matter, are already
consistent with the states' own spending priorities.”210 States can also
decline federal funding, holding out for a better deal. Since the Supreme
Court limited the Medicaid expansion in the 2010 healthcare law, for
example, fourteen states have rejected health funding totaling about $8.4
billion covering roughly 3.6 million of their citizens.211 Once grants are
made, states draw on political resources in Congress to “bargain with the
national government over how stringently the national government will
enforce the conditions ostensibly attached to the national funds.”212
Outcomes achieved through conditional spending, in short, are bargained
for all the way down.
Judicial doctrine nevertheless imposes two constraints on
intergovernmental bargaining over conditional spending. First, the Court
requires that conditions be unambiguous and “[r]elated” to the federal
interest in particular national projects or programs.213 This ensures that “the
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”214
Second, notice and nexus requirements have recently been supplemented by
an inchoate anti-coercion rule. The Court thus partially invalidated the
Medicaid expansion contained in the 2010 healthcare legislation on
coercion grounds.215 Unlike earlier Spending Clause enactments considered
by the Court, the 2010 Affordable Care Act tied new funding to an ongoing
funding stream in a way that attached “significant … new conditions … to
continued participation in an entrenched and lucrative cooperative program”
in a way that the Court deemed objectionable.216 The Court’s opaque
formulation of its anti-coercion rule renders its precedential force
210
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uncertain.217 But the new rule does not foreclose bargaining, but rather
raises its cost by introducing a new form of uncertainty.
C.

The Pervasiveness of Intermural Bargaining

In her majority opinion in New York v. United States, Justice
O’Connor ventured that “[t]he Constitution's division of power among the
three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another,
whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.”218
Whatever its merit as judicial aspiration, her observation falls short as an
account of current constitutional practice. Intermural bargaining to
reallocate institutional entitlements created by the Constitution is the norm,
not the exception. On the separation of powers side, Congress is allowed to
alienate lawmaking power. It cannot, however, reserve a quantum of such
authority to itself. The elected branches are also free to rearrange fiscal
decision-making provided the resulting arrangements do not reserve to the
president any line-item authority. Yet if the executive employs its large
delegated powers to achieve fiscal effects (either by, say, spending less or
by more aggressively enforcing federal tax laws), no constitutional concern
is raised. Adding additional suppleness to fiscal arrangements, the House
can relinquish its right to originate revenue bills through shell legislation or
tax treaties, apparently with impunity.
On the federalism side, the Court has favored bargaining, albeit
within constraints. It has thus created entitlements in the form of the anticommandeering rule, state sovereign immunity, and exclusive domains of
state regulation. Given Congress’s conditional spending authority, states
can bargain away these entitlements in exchange for federal funds. More
mundanely, the passage and implementation of federal laws supply ample
opportunities for intergovernmental bargaining.
However pervasive intermural bargaining is in contemporary
constitutional law, it is not well theorized. Both the Court and
commentators tend to view intermural bargaining in piecemeal fashion, not
as a coherent singular phenomenon. Accordingly, it is simply unclear
whether the Court has permitted the optimal amount or distribution of
217
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structural constitutional bargaining. The Court may have erred in either
direction by allowing too much or too little bargaining. Ascertaining
whether there is sufficient or excessive bargaining requires a framework for
evaluating its downsides and rewards. The next two Parts take up that task.
III.

The Default Rule for Intermural Bargaining

When representatives of institutions negotiate mutually beneficial
deals to reallocate roles in the lawmaking process, elements of regulatory
authority, or enforcement and administrative capacity, should federal
judges, office holders in other branches, and the public accede to the
ensuing deals? That is, should the approbatory presumption employed in the
private law context apply here too? In this Part, I argue for a presumption in
favor of intermural bargaining. The presumption, along with the exceptions
developed in Part IV, should primarily guide officials and their constituents,
and secondarily should provide a basis for judicial deference to intermural
deals.
I develop this claim in two steps. First, I examine and find wanting
three potential grounds for taking Justice O’Connor at her word and flatly
prohibiting all intermural bargaining.219 Accounting for textual, historical
and consequential concerns, I conclude that a generalized suspicion of all
interbranch and intergovernmental deals is unwarranted. Second, I identify
positive consequences flowing from institutional deal-making, amplifying
further the case for an affirmative default. The Court, I conclude, has
correctly declined in practice to view intermural bargains with suspicion
pace Justice O’Connor’s dictum.
A.

The Weak Case for a Categorical Rule against Intermural
Bargaining

I first develop and evaluate two arguments to the effect that
intermural bargaining should never be permitted. These rest on the
definition of a constitution, and the core functions of a constitution. Neither
argument, in my view, yields a reason to adopt a presumption against
institutional bargaining.
1.
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A common feature of constitutions, including the U.S. Constitution,
is entrenchment beyond change via the ordinary procedures of quotidian
democracy.220 Entrenchment so defined is more than mere endurance.221 It
also requires procedural rules that make constitutional change more onerous
than the mine run of lawmaking action. Article V of the Constitution does
so by setting forth a two-stage procedure of proposal and ratification that
makes textual amendment to the Constitution inordinately hard.222 If
entrenchment beyond ordinary politics is a necessary aspect of
constitutionalism, as Article V might suggest, then the prospect of
intermural bargaining should seem deeply troubling: How can foundational
entitlements—the basic building blocks of our nation’s democracy—be
lightly frittered away by transient office holders in exchange for mere
policy advantages? Perhaps a “working [c]onstitution” is one that political
actors treat as “not subject to abrogation or material alteration.”223 On this
view, a strong presumption against bargaining is implied in the definition of
a constitution. A reading of the Constitution that permitted such bargaining
would defeat the purpose of adopting a constitution. This argument might
be framed not only in definitional terms, but also developed as a claim
about the original public meaning of a constitution as a legal norm meant to
stand beyond ordinary politics.
This argument from entrenchment, whether pitched in definitional or
originalist terms, is less persuasive than it first appears for three reasons.
First, not all nations’ constitutions are entrenched beyond ordinary politics;
accordingly, there is no definitional link between constitutionalism and
entrenchment. Many other nations’ constitutions, in contrast to the United
States’, invite constitutional amendment through procedures that resemble
those of ordinary politics. Israel, for example, employs ordinary Knesset
220
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procedures and voting rules for adopting new Basic Laws.224 The
Columbian constitution of 1886 allows the legislature to amend it after three
readings and a supermajority vote in a subsequent legislative session.225
Closer to home, “some fourteen American states to this day require the
people to be consulted on a regular basis by the legislature as to whether to
call a constitutional convention.”226 In effect, these state constitutions invite
the electorate, as a matter of routine politics, to renegotiate questions of
perceived constitutional magnitude. If entrenchment is not a necessary
feature of constitutions as a whole, it is hard to see why it should be
required in respect to discrete elements of a constitution, such as the
location of lawmaking or regulatory entitlements.
Second, it is not clear that the Constitution’s text mandates a
prohibition, or even a presumption, against institutional bargaining. It may
be tempting to assume that the textual vesting of entitlements should be
glossed as inviolate, so that Congress could never bargain away a sliver of
legislative power, the executive could not trade on its veto, and the states
could not negotiate away fragments of their sovereignty. But the text of the
Constitution contains no plainly stated rule barring any and all bargaining
over institutional powers. Nothing in the text, that is, directs that
institutional entitlements should be read as inalienable as opposed to default
assignments.227 To the contrary, Madison’s proposal to the first Congress
that the Constitution’s distribution of power among the branches be read as
exclusive, precluding any innovations by later generations, was never
adopted.228 That Madison saw a need for such a proposal, and that the first
Congress rejected the idea powerfully suggests that the Constitution’s
textual distribution of institutional authorities should be read as a set of
default entitlements subject to alteration by later political branch
negotiation.
224
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The Framers were familiar with default rules. They employed a
default rule in respect to the size of Article III. The Constitution’s text
requires only the creation of one Supreme Court staffed with solely one
Justice.229 In what came to be known as the Madisonian compromise, the
decision whether to depart from this default state was assigned to
Congress.230 It left a central element of interbranch design and
intergovernmental relations to postratification legislators’ discretion.
Federal jurisdiction, in consequence, became a “battlefield” on which “the
sometimes-ill-defined scheme of federal government” was fought out
between the national government and the states.231 Once created, moreover,
Article III tribunals complement, and also compete with, state tribunals.
Congress can award federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain
subject matters.232 Or it might allow removal as a tool for disciplining state
tribunals.233 The scope of jurisdictional optionality, moreover, may be even
greater than the Madisonian compromise if Article III, Section 2, Clause 2
is read to enable Congress to move grants of jurisdiction freely between the
Supreme Court’s original and appellate wings. Of course, the Supreme
Court famously held otherwise in 1803.234 Marbury v. Madison’s
conclusion that Congress could not add to the Court’s enumerated original
jurisdiction, though, has been powerfully challenged.235 There is no reason,
moreover, to think the Constitution’s use of default rules is limited to
Article III. Article I, for example, uses defeasible defaults in respect to the
U.S. CONST. art. III, §1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”).
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first congressional apportionment and the timing of Congress’s first
meeting.236
Finally, original public meaning does not furnish any basis for a per
se bar on institutional deals. Conventional originalist analysis instead
incorporates the outcomes of interbranch negotiation into its hermeneutical
matrix. As one leading advocate of originalism has explained, political
actors fashion “constitutional constructions … in the context of political
debate, but to the degree that they are successful [such constructions]
constraint future political debate.”237 For example, one much-analyzed
question concerns the President’s authority to remove certain executive
branch officials as pursuant to Article II.238 Such power arguably lies at the
cusp of the President’s power to “take Care” that the laws are enforced,239
and Congress’s horizontal “Necessary and Proper” power240 to structure
other branches of the federal government.241 To resolve this dispute, leading
originalists focus not just on the constitutional text (which at best is
indeterminate), but instead find definitive resolution in the post-ratification
bargain reached by the First Congress and President Washington over the
first cabinet departments of War, Foreign Affairs, and Treasury. 242 If it is
feasible to use post-ratification intermural settlements as a source of
constitutional meaning, it follows that there is no necessary incongruity
under originalist accounts of Constitution and intermural bargaining.
To be sure, the application of originalist tools to specific
institutional entitlements might generate the conclusion that specific
bargains lie out of constitutional bounds. For example, there is a vigorous
debate on whether delegations of Article I rulemaking authority to
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administrative agencies are consistent with the original understanding.243
Without seeking to settle that intractable debate, it suffices here to say that
no version of originalism in circulation today rejects all interbranch
bargains. Indeed, one of the leading originalist accounts of Article I allows
for intermural bargaining over legislative power. Developed by Professor
Thomas Merrill, this account suggests that “Congress has the power to vest
executive and judicial officers with authority to act with the force of law,
including the authority to promulgate legislative regulations functionally
indistinguishable from statutes” but “executive and judicial officers have no
inherent authority to act with the force of law, but must trace any such
authority to some provision of enacted law.”244 Hence, even in respect to
core Article I entitlements, there is a plausible originalist reading of the
Constitution consistent with a broad scope for interbranch deal-making.
In sum, the entrenchment-based argument against intermural
bargaining fails whether framed as a matter of definitional logic or
historical meaning. The Constitution contains a mix of default and
mandatory rules. The text contains no simple instruction about how to gloss
each entitlement. Rather than categorically resisting intermural bargaining,
it accordingly makes more sense to analyze specific institutional
entitlements on a retail basis.
2.

Entrenchment and the Functions of Constitutionalism

A second argument against intermural bargaining under any
circumstances might rest on functional grounds. A categorical bar might be
justified, that is, if the deals that result undermine core, irreducible
functions of a constitution. Jon Elster has posited that “[t]he purpose of
entrenched clauses [in a constitution] … is to ensure a reasonable degree of
stability in the political system and to protect minority rights.” 245 If stability
is a central good produced by constitutions, the Constitution’s initial
distribution of institutional entitlements might provide an institutional
243
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grammar for future politics that stabilizes expectations and permits the
development of democratic norms and traditions.246 Institutional stability
might enable specific public goods such as accountability through regular
elections. Further, it might enable the cultivation of private goods by
allowing long-term planning to achieve slow-growing investments and life
projects.247 On this view, an “important—perhaps the important—function
of law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is to be done.”248
Intermural bargaining should therefore be rejected because it unsettles
expectations of what law is, where law comes from, and how law
changes—and hence robs federal law and institutions of beneficial stability.
The argument from stability, if not without force, does not justify a
categorical bar on institutional bargaining. To begin with, even accepting
the proposition that institutional stability is required to secure public and
private goods, it is not clear this warrants a bar on intermural bargaining.
American constitutional history, as Part II demonstrated, is characterized by
nontrivial levels of intermural bargaining, with concomitant shifts in
responsibility for policies ratcheting between branches or rattling up and
down between ladder between the national government and the states. If the
basic stabilizing functions of a constitution were impeded by institutional
bargaining, then the 1787 organic document would have failed to enable
democratic norm development or effective private investment. The
evidence, however, suggests otherwise for a number of reasons.
First, it is hardly plain that some quantum of intermural bargaining
is inimical to institutional stability. To be sure, if trades between institutions
were sufficiently dense and frequent, voters might have difficulty
determining how to allocate blame or praise for policy outcomes. Unable to
predict which institutions would be responsible for regulation or taxation,
long range planning would also be handicapped. Intermural bargaining,
246
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however, does not in fact occur at such a rapid clip. There is no reason to
think voters are unable to understand the mechanics of stable, long-standing
arrangements such as the administrative state or cooperative federalism.
Second, even though the institutional locus of policymaking might shift
over time, the existence of a stable national party system dampens the
degree of policy oscillation by defining and limiting the field of policy
contestation.249 Third, and relatedly, voters rely on partisan proxies and
other heuristics in determining how to act at the ballot box.250 Democratic
accountability is preserved so long as those proxies remain effective at
aggregating information. There is no reason to think intermural bargaining
generally undermines the epistemic value of democratic proxies.
*

*

*

In summary, categorical objections to institutional bargaining, either
derived from a definition of constitutionalism or an account of the
Constitution’s functions, ought to be rejected. At a high level of generality,
there is no per se objection to institutional trades.
B.

The Inevitability of Institutional Bargaining

Whereas the previous section dispatched arguments against
intermural bargaining, this section offers a positive case for the practice. I
contend that bargaining of some sort is both inevitable and desirable for two
reasons. First, the absence of complete specification of constitutional
entitlements and spillover effects make bargaining unavoidable. Second, the
Constitution is not a homeostatic system, but an evolutionary one. The
inevitable translation of constitutional concepts forward in time against the
backdrop of shifting institutional, social, and economic circumstances
necessarily generates intermural conflicts even if the initial text has been
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completely specified. Bargaining is needed to resolve these conflicts in the
first instance.
1.

Spillovers between Constitutional Entitlements

The Constitution is an incomplete contract in the sense that it does
not resolve all potential questions concerning the allocation of
endogenously defined entitlements.251 Like real property, questions about
how to assign the costs of mitigating spillover effects arise. Unlike the real
property context, the allocation of spillover-related costs will often lack a
natural and intuitive answer. Instead, their resolution is best achieved
through intermural bargaining.
To see why the development of some mechanism for settling
institutional boundary dispute questions that arise under the Constitution is
inevitable, it is helpful to return to Ronald Coase’s examples of how
ambiguity in real property entitlements arise:
[A] confectioner … used two mortars and pestles in
connection with his business (one had been in operation in
the same position for more than 60 years and the other for
more than 26 years). A doctor then came to occupy
neighboring premises (in Wimpole Street). The
confectioner's machinery caused the doctor no harm until,
eight years after he had first occupied the premises, he built a
consulting room at the end of his garden right against the
confectioner's kitchen. It was then found that the noise and
vibration caused by the confectioner's machinery made it
difficult for the doctor to use his new consulting room.252
Coase explained that the doctor secured an injunction against the noise, but
then observed that this property entitlement could be bargained away if the
confectioner’s use was more valuable. Further, had the case been resolved
in favor of the confectioner, precisely the same kind of bargaining might
251
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also have occurred, with the entitlement still ending up in the hands of the
party that valued it.253 This symmetry of outcomes under disparate legal
rules yielded a lesson: In many cases in which the use of one entitlement
has a spillover effect on the use of another entitlement, there is no obvious
or natural or inevitable way to parcel out the entitlements. It is simply “not
useful to speak of one party to an externality as being the cause of any
problem of incompatible demands.” 254
Spillover effects of the kind Coase identified are not limited to
doctors and confectioners. There are many instances in which one
institution’s exercise of a structural entitlement will interact with another
institution’s exercise of an entitlement, and where the “default package of
entitlements” described in the constitutional text provide no obvious or
natural benchmark for resolving the conflict.255 In such spillover cases,
something more than mere excavation of the constitutional text is required
to justify an outcome. Intermural negotiation, similar to the sort that Coase
predicts arising between the doctor and the confectioner, provides an
obvious means of resolving the context and allocating the disputed right to
its highest value user. In these spillover cases, intermural bargaining
provides a device for allocating interests.
The existence of intermural spillovers in the absence of any such
intuitive or obvious default disposition can be illustrated with examples
from both federalism and separation of powers domains. Spillover effects
are pervasive in a geographic federation in which member states are
contiguous with each other and jurisdictional lines are porous. The Court’s
Dormant Commerce Clause case law, which targets state enactments that
dampen the flow of interstate commerce, is an effort to manage tradeId. For Coase, a simple social welfare function determined the right’s optimal
assignment. Id. at 27 (“What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the
harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the
action which produces the harm.”).
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related spillovers between states and to maintain a national market.256
Similarly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is a mechanism for citizens
of one state to remedy disabilities imposed by citizens of another.257
Spillovers effects also occur between states and the federal
government. The constitutional text’s failure to provide any simple rule for
allocating spillover costs between the states and the national government
was at issue in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona.258 At issue there,
as noted previously, was a provision of the NVRA requiring states to
“accept and use” federal voter registration forms.259 Although Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion resolved the case on statutory interpretation
grounds, the nub of the case involved a conflict between two constitutional
entitlements. On the one hand, Congress’s authority pursuant to the
Elections Clause allows it to “make or alter” any state law concerning the
“Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives.”260 On the other hand, the states maintain authority to
determine “the composition of the federal electorate.”261 Intergovernmental
frictions arise because time, place, and manner regulations—such as the
NVRA’s streamlined framework for by-mail voter registration—necessary
alter the composition of the voting electorate by lowering or raising the cost
of accessing the polls. Less costly registration enlarges the pool of expected
voters, and vice versa. The Constitution distinguishes between federal laws
that regulate the time, place, and manner of voting, and state laws
concerning the composition of the electorate as if these were hermetically
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sealed categories. As the NVRA shows, that boundary is elusive. Like
Coase’s doctor and confectionary, the national government and the states
are locked in a bilateral relationship in which plenary employment of one
party’s powers necessarily impinges on plenary employment of others’
authorities.
Similar ambiguities in the boundaries between different institutions’
constitutional entitlements can be found in separation of powers contexts.
For example, the Court’s removal jurisprudence is animated by the overlap
of the President’s power to take care laws are enforced and Congress’s
power pursuant to the horizontal component of the Necessary and Proper
Clause to structure the executive branch.262 To analyze removal disputes as
raising solely the powers of one or the other elected branch is to gloss over
the question of how institutional borders are to be drawn when the text
engenders overlap.263 It is to assume, rather than reason out, an answer.
Spillovers also underlie cases such as Chadha v. INS264 and Bowsher
v. Synar.265 As framed by the Court, both cases hinged on a conceptual
distinction between legislative functions and executive functions. In
Chadha, the Court characterized the “altering [of] legal rights, duties and
relations” as “essentially legislative in purpose and effect.”266 In Bowsher, it
stated that “[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the
legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law,”267 and
hence a task for Article II authorities alone. A spillover arises because
interpreting a law often necessarily means changing rights and duties.
Hence, the (forbidden) application of the legislative veto against Mr.
Chadha is also an interpretation of the immigration statute. The budgetary
reductions that would have been effected by the Comptroller General under
the 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act also altered
“rights, duties and relations” by changing the fiscal entitlements of diverse
federal grantees. At least as defined by the Court in those cases, putatively
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mutually exclusive core functions of the legislature and the executive
overlap.268
The concepts of ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ cannot be applied to
the complexities of observed governance in ways that yield resolving
clarity.269 As Justice Stevens recognized in Bowsher, “governmental power
cannot always be readily characterized with only one of ... three labels.”270
To be sure, there are other ways of reconciling Bowsher and Chadha. Both
cases, the Court later noted, disapprove congressional selfaggrandizement.271 But that reconciliation does not undermine my point
here: Efforts by the Court to determine whether and how to separate
government functions have dominated debates in constitutional theory since
the Founding. But absent some even deeper account decomposing those
elementary particles yet further, boundary disputes will remain pervasive.272
These examples demonstrate that constitutional entitlements, like
real property, generate spillover problems that can be characterized as either
A’s interference with B or B’s interference with A. This would have not
surprised the Framers. James Madison, most famously, prophesized that the
Constitution would be “more or less obscure and equivocal, until [its]
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions
268
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and adjudications.”273 As Madison’s dictum suggests, some mechanism for
resolving boundary disputes is inevitable. At least to date, the elected
branches and the states have principally resorted to bargaining as an
expeditious and inexpensive means to resolve disputes. Absent some reason
to think that this tradition has always been wrong-headed or misguided, the
persistence of spillover problems provides a threshold reason for accepting
intermural bargaining as a legitimate constitutional practice.
2.

The Myth of Constitutional Homeostasis

Bargaining is useful for a second reason. Even if the Constitution
perfectly specified institutional entitlements, ambiguity in boundaries would
remain unavoidable due to institutional, social, and economic change over
time. Bargaining is a logical, and historically tested, mechanism for dealing
with the changes thereby wrought to institutional boundaries.
The Constitution, unlike the human body, is not homeostatic.274 Its
internal shifts are invisible vectors that over generations thrust into conflict
previously isolate institutions. That “changed circumstances” might alter
structural constitutional relations is, of course, a familiar idea.275 The
national economy, for example, has transformed itself—dilating westward,
congealing into new corporate forms, molting with each rise and fall of a
new transportation or communication technology—belying the idea of a
delimited Commerce Clause power.276 As the nation’s geopolitical
aspirations have swelled with shifting ideologies and aspirations,277 and the
United States has shifted “from inwardness and isolation into the dominant
world power,”278 so the balance of power between the executive and
Congress has recalibrated. New external pressures alter not just the
interbranch balance, but also the national government’s relations with the
273
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states.279 Nor have the background assumptions of democracy remained
constant. Rather, the (long delayed) entrance of women and people of color
into the polity have transformed the electorate beyond early republican
recognition.280 Even the background assumptions of constitutional order are
subject to sub rosa transformations: Recent scholarship suggests that basic
assumptions about federalism’s inherent logic were not immutable through
even the early Republic.281
All these changes impact the scope and operation of structural
constitutional entitlements. It is standard to assume that subsequent
constitutional interpreters should seek “to restore the status quo” out of
fidelity to the original design.282 But it is not clear this is so. It may be that
original institutional equilibria cannot be recreated without minatory social
costs. For example, narrowing Congress’s Commerce power to antebellum
dimensions might cripple the national economy. The national regulatory
state also cannot be undone without large economic disruption. The task of
resolving new institutional conflicts, in short, is not well described as an
exercise in fidelity. Rather, as exogenous historical change presses into
conflict institutional entitlements that previously stood apart, resolution of
those conflicts must attend not only to historical warrants but also to present
social goods. As Part II demonstrated, it has been intermural bargaining that
has played the critical role in efforts to maintain the Constitution as a going
concern.
Intermural bargaining is an especially salient channel for
institutional dispute resolution given the preclusive difficulty of
279
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constitutional change through Article V.283 Unable to adjust the text through
Article V without exorbitant transaction costs, institutions have strong
incentives to bargain among themselves to reach stable outcomes.
Paradoxically, negotiated change may stabilize the overall constitutional
dispensation by staving off economic or social crisis. On this view, stability
under conditions of social, economic, and geopolitical flux is not obtained
by resisting new institutional arrangements. Rather, it is secured by
allowing elected officials to experiment with new governance mechanisms.
C.

Judicial Review as a Substitute for Bargaining

The fact that intermural boundaries inevitably overlap, generating
conflicts with no obvious resolution, does not lead inexorably to the
conclusion that bargaining is the optimal resolution mechanism for the
ensuing disputes. An alternative institutional mechanism might dominate
bargaining in terms of cost and accuracy. An obvious contender is judicial
review. A case for judicial primacy in resolving intermural disputes might
start with the observation that federal courts sooner or later do confront and
adjudicate the constitutionality of many, if not all, institutional boundary
questions that might otherwise be resolved by intermural bargaining.284
Why not then just cut to the chase? Prioritization of judicial action might be
grounded on comparative institutional competence grounds. Federal courts
lack an institutional stake in many structural constitutional disputes. Courts’
impartiality makes them especially well-situated to act as arbiters in
interbranch or intergovernmental conflicts.285 Further, judicial review does
not suffer from a potential distortion manifested in intermural bargaining.
Institutions trade over constitutional entitlements in the absence of the thick
array of buyers and sellers commonly thought necessary to well-functioning
markets.286 As a result, bargaining failures and difficulties in valuing
institutional assets might prevent socially desirable transfers from
occurring.
This section considers and rejects the possibility that courts should
be favored forums for resolving intermural boundary disputes. It develops
283
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four reasons for rejecting the primacy of judicial resolution. These
arguments will be supplemented in Part IV, which argues further that courts
are ill-positioned to determine whether the conditions for resisting
intermural negotiation are satisfied in respect to particular deals. To be
clear, my claim here is not that courts should have no role at all. The use of
courts as backstopping venues for the resolution of some constitutional
questions is deeply embedded in our constitutional disposition. I focus here
instead on reasons for relegating courts to a distinctly second tier.
As a threshold matter, Article III of the Constitution has been read to
bar federal courts from acting in the absence of a concrete dispute.287 To
obtain a judicial resolution in the absence of bargaining, therefore, one
institution would have to infringe on another’s putative prerogatives to
precipitate a justiciable dispute. But despite Corwin’s famous dictum, the
separation of powers is not in practice an “invitation to struggle.”288 Instead,
“[v]iolations of separation of powers principles tend to occur with the
consent of two branches rather than unilateral incursion by one.”289 No
mechanism in the Constitution ensures that the transient, elected occupants
of federal or state offices will be empire-builders keen to extend their
demesnes.290 Accordingly, a mechanism for resolving institutional
ambiguities that relies on aggressive intramural incursions as a necessary
predicate for clarification would founder on incentive compatibility
grounds. Further, requiring branches and states to instigate contentious
border disputes may create more litigation-related and frictional costs that
bargaining obviates. There is no obvious reason why those costs should be
incurred in every case, as opposed to solely those cases in which intermural
bargaining breaks down.
Second, the tools that courts employ to resolve institutional border
disputes may be clumsy, costly, and prone to manipulation—and so not
necessarily superior to institutional bargaining. Rather than conducing to
uncertainty, their persistent deployment may destabilize expectations of
institutional behavior. As this Part has demonstrated, many institutional
See Federal Election Com'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–21 (1998) (noting that “courts
will not ‘pass upon ... abstract, intellectual problems’” (citation omitted)).
288
Corwin was only talking about foreign policy. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
289
Gersen supra note 81, at 356 n.147.
290
See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 915, 920 (2005) (arguing that officials often act based on personal and political
incentives that do not entail defending institutional powers and prerogatives of the branch
that employs them).
287

53

border disputes arise when neither constitutional text nor original
understanding provide univocal answers. As a result, judicial resolution of
intermural border disputes tends to pivot on contentious, highly
controverted theories of constitutional interpretation. In Arizona v. Inter
Tribal Council of Arizona, for example, Justice Thomas suggested that an
appropriate default rule could be deduced from the anti-centripal logic of
the Founding moment.291 On Justice Thomas’s account, that resolving
default rule arises not from the text but from a contested historical account
of the federal government’s formation and a highly controversial political
theory of divided sovereignty. In an earlier case, Justice Stevens had set
forth an alternative theory of the Constitution’s implicit political theory
(one that is perhaps no less controversial) that would yield different answers
to the boundary question.292
It is by no means clear that recourse to grand constitutional theory is
a superior decisional procedure to bargaining. Disputes that turn on
historical evidence and constitutional theory will tend to be expensive to
litigate. Ex ante, they produce uncertainty. There is also no guarantee that
dueling grand theories of constitutional design yield anything other than a
“draw.”293 On the contrary, observed patterns of ideological voting on the
Supreme Court may raise a concern that the wide array of historical,
theoretical, and precedential material from which answers can be derived
leaves large free rein for judges’ priors.294 As a result, reliance on grand
theory to settle institutional border disputes might undermine the
predictability of dispute resolution. Judicial resolution, in short, is not
necessarily a stabilizing force.
Third, if intermural settlements of institutional boundary disputes
are largely consensual (as appears to be the case), it may well be that those
who challenge them in court are either disgruntled defectors 295 or third
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parties with an ulterior agenda.296 Rather than selecting for cases in which
an institutional settlement is most troubling, the ensuing pattern of
challenges to intermural bargains will result in challenges against
institutional fixes from defectors or rent-seeking private litigants. In this
way, litigation is most likely to occur when a structural fix has resulted in
relatively large welfare gains by eliminating significant rent-seeking.
Litigation is least likely to be observed, by contrast, when an institutional
fixes has had negligible effects, or it has welfare-dampening effects and
potential spoilers have been bought off.
Therefore, in cases in which an intermural bargain is an effort to
extract rents, say from the general populace, it will be possible to buy off all
internal defectors and hostile interest groups with a portion of those rents.
By contrast, when an intermural settlement is beneficial to the public at
large, there will likely not be resources freed up to pay for bribes to head off
hostile law suits. But if courts are most likely to pick off those institutional
settlements that are most valuable, and least likely to deal with normatively
troubling deals, we might fairly doubt that they are the optimal site for
resolution of institutional boundary disputes in constitutional law. Again,
this suggests courts’ role should be a secondary one.
Fourth, the comparative epistemic competence case in favor of
judicial primacy is hard to sustain. On the one hand, judges’ impartiality is
easy to exaggerate. Federal courts do not stand in perfect equipoise between
Congress and the executive. Of course, Congress has authority to recalibrate
the scope of federal-court jurisdiction and judicial budgets. But this does
not guarantee a level interbranch playing field.297 Empirical studies confirm
that the identity of the appointing President has an outsize influence on
judges’ subsequent voting behavior.298 So great is the “predictive success of
296
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the presidential-appointment measure of [judicial] ideology,” that many
studies use it without detailed comment.299 In addition to this ex ante bias in
favor of the appointing President, the executive has important ex post
opportunities to influence judges. For example, federal courts rely on the
President and his or her officials for enforcement of their orders.300 Judges
may also be cognizant of the power that the President has to veto
jurisdiction-stripping proposals, and otherwise to protect the institutional
and fiscal resources of the courts.301 Given that these ex ante and ex post
pressures both tilt toward the executive and away from other branches, it
seems fair to ask why one would expect federal courts to be neutral as
between Congress and the White House. The same point can be made more
parsimoniously respecting federalism: As their name suggests, the federal
courts are not situated in equipoise between the states and the national
government. Even the Justices’ occasional federalism enthusiasms can be
traced back to changes in the preferences of national political actors.302
Accordingly, there is no strong reason to anticipate consistent neutrality
between levels of government on the part of Article III courts.
Any argument for preferring political branch bargaining over
judicial settlement must also account for the strengths and weaknesses of
nonjudicial settlement. In contrast to judicial resolution, intermural
bargaining may function tolerably well in a significant proportion of cases.
To be sure, the absence of a thick market and price mechanism for
institutional bargaining may mean that some socially desirable bargains do
not occur.303 While this might justify reliance on judicial review as a
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complement to institutional bargaining, it does not undermine the utility of
observed intermural resolutions.
Further, there is no reason for categorical skepticism of elected
actors’ incentives. The practice of serious constitutionalism within elected
bodies in the United States has a long historical pedigree. The first
Congresses took the task of constitutional interpretation seriously without
being hamstrung by institutional or partisan bias.304 Today, this practice,
which is known as departmentalism, has many academic defenders.305 The
robustness of that departmentalist tradition contrasts with the relatively
recent vintage of claims to judicial supremacy.306 Setting these two histories
alongside each other, it becomes clear that the role of courts as neutral
arbiters of intermural disputes is historically contingent, dating back to the
Civil War.307 The institutions originally vested with institutional
entitlements by the Constitution managed to resolve intermural disputes for
decades before the courts ever got involved. While the benefits of judicial
involvement may be overstated, the costs of elected branch resolution also
seem smaller than might first appear. Without resolving all of the hard
normative questions raised by departmentalism, it is plausible to conclude
that when there are multiple branches or governments bargaining over an
entitlement, there is no reason to think that courts should be necessary
forums for constitutional resolution because of their putative impartiality.
This evaluation of judicial settlement’s limitations and intermural
bargaining’s advantages reflects contemporary constitutional adjudicatory
practice. For while federal judges presently employ no systemic theory of
intermural bargaining—indeed, they do not even recognize that the
phenomenon cuts across transubstantive lines—they nonetheless tend to
approach voluntary settlement of institutional boundary lines with a
deferential attitude. The judicial posture of deference evinced toward such
settlements—while rebuttable, as shown by cases such as Chadha,
304
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Bowsher, and Clinton—appropriately reflects the epistemic and institutional
constraints of judicial review, in addition to the merits of intermural
settlement. To be sure, one cannot reason from observed practice to
normative prescription without committing the naturalistic fallacy.
Nevertheless, courts’ frequent deference to bargained-for institutional
outcomes suggests that a regime of limited judicial superintendence does
not produce intolerable outcomes.308 Judicial deference instead reflects the
well-founded view that “acquiesced-in government practices … embody
wisdom accumulated over time and are unlikely to threaten the basic
balance of power between Congress and the Executive.”309
In sum, the limits of judicial capacity and the merits of intermural
bargaining undermine the case for judicial exclusivity, even if they do not
establish that courts should play no role at all. As a result, there is no reason
to think that courts should always be preferred forums for the resolution of
intermural boundary disputes. Instead, courts should treat the outcomes of
such negotiation with at least a measure of deference in recognition of
elected actors’ primacy.
*

*

*

There is no cause to lament the fact that bargaining over institutional
entitlements is inevitable. The Constitution’s textual specification of
institutional entitlements is inevitably incomplete. Hydraulic pressures
imposed by economic, institutional, and geopolitical change inexorably
foster new institutional tensions. Nor is there reason to appeal to the
judiciary as the default arbiter of institutional boundary disputes. To the
contrary, the arguments marshaled in this Part suggest that intermural
bargaining should be the default mechanism for renegotiating the
boundaries between institutions vested with constitutional entitlements.
Federal judges should review the outcomes of intermural bargaining only
deferentially. Just as in the private market context, that is, Coasean
bargaining should be approved as a favored means for identifying the
optimal location of an entitlement.
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IV.

The Limits of Intermural Bargaining

A presumption in favor of intermural bargaining need not, though,
be conclusive. Even if intra- or intergovernmental negotiation generates
beneficial outcomes in the mine run of cases, it may nonetheless
periodically yield socially undesirable results. This Part develops two
criteria for determining whether a structural constitutional bargain should be
prohibited and considers whether either criteria provides a platform for
judicial review. In the first task, my argument here mines the private law
framework sketched in Part I and applied in Part III. Using that body of
rules as a template, I propose that the categories of negative externalities
and paternalism can, mutatis mutandi, serve as limits on institutional
bargaining. In the ordinary contracting context, both concepts are informed
by models of individual behavior.310 I do not assume these models
mechanically translate into the institutional context, where psychological
and decisional dynamics will be quite different. Rather, I endeavor to
demonstrate that the same concepts furnish traction in the institutional
context given the nature of institutional decision-making.
The identification of limits to permissible intermural negotiations
again implicates the question whether courts should police bargains.
Building on the discussion in Part III.C, I suggest reasons to be skeptical
that courts will identify accurately instances in which institutional bargains
go too far. I examine instances in which the Court has imposed
inalienablility rules, focusing on largely separation of powers cases where
the Court has been most active in this regard.311 Based on this analysis, I
suggest that the inalienability rules should not have been imposed in leading
cases such as Chadha v. INS,312 Bowsher v. Synar,313 and Clinton v. New
York.314 Moreover, courts have tended to assign excessive weight to shifts
in regulatory entitlements achieved through custom or historical gloss. This
track record again undermines courts’ primacy in regulating intermural
310
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bargaining and reinforces the case for judicial deference. Accordingly,
platforms for judicial intervention may exist, but they should be employed
with care and deference.
A.

Negative Externalities

I first specify the possibility that limits on intermural bargaining
might be justified by a concern about negative externalities, and consider
whether courts are well-positioned to enforce such limits. Institutional
frameworks established in the Constitution, such as the separation of
powers and federalism, are justified in terms of their beneficial effects for
citizens.315 According to the Supreme Court, both of these structural
principles engender individual liberty by minimizing the monopoly power
of any one governmental entity.316 By dispersing power between plural
institutional sites, the Constitution diminishes the risk of tyranny and
promotes limited government.317 A first argument for limiting intermural
bargaining would focus on the possibility that the ensuing deals
compromised these positive externalities of the Constitution’s architecture.
Note that this argument does not suggest that any perceived thirdparty harm justifies a constraint on intermural bargaining. It suggests rather
that when a value that the Constitution specifically seeks to promote (such
as accountability or liberty) is compromised by an institutional innovation,
the innovation producing such an effect should be treated with suspicion.
Sometimes, intermural deals can be struck precisely to assign economic
harms in the most efficient manner way possible. The LLRWPA may be a
good example of this.318 Hence, the mere fact that some private parties are
disadvantaged by a deal in some way is not sufficient to warrant its close
315
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scrutiny. There must be reason to believe a constitutional value is
compromised.
An externalities-based justification for placing certain institutional
deals beyond bounds might start from the observation that some
institutional deals redound to the detriment of the public as a result of
elected representatives’ misbegotten incentives. Agency slack leads
faithless elected agents to endorse institutional deals with negative
externalities. Those agents defect due to self-interest, divergent preferences,
or a want of information or skill.319 But democratic politics at both federal
and state levels employ regular elections to cabin agency slack. Hence, an
externalities-based argument for limiting intermural bargaining must also
explain why elections insufficiently discipline officials in dealmaking with
other institutions.320
The concept of negative externalities, in short, can be translated into
the structural constitutional context. But how should it be enforced? One
starting point in answering this question is the Court’s separation of powers
case-law, which can be explained in terms of externalities. Examination of
those cases, however, suggests that courts have considerable difficulty
accurately identifying plausible, externality-derived limits on bargaining,
and at minimum should proceed with caution when acting on the belief that
they have such a case at bar.
First, the limits on delegation in Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton all
echo a numerus clausus principle, i.e., a limit on the variety of forms
property interests can take.321 In real property law, the numerus clausus
principle is justified on the ground that “[s]tandardization of property rights
reduces [the] measurement costs” of third parties by eliminating the
prospect of idiosyncratically defined entitlements.322 By analogy,
prohibitions on legislative vetoes, lockbox rules, and line-item vetoes might
be justified in terms of negative epistemic spillover: Each institutional
innovation tampers with the channels of democratic accountability. It thus
raises the cost to voters of observing individual politicians. Just as the
319
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Court’s hostility to some campaign finance regulation is explained by a
wish to clear channels of political competition, so these separation-ofpowers rules serve to promote accountability by cabining the costs of
deriving a national policy’s etiology.323
Second, and alternatively, the results in these cases might be
defended on the ground that each of these institutional innovations
concentrates power, thwarting the Constitution’s reliance on fragmented
governmental power as a means to producing the rule of law by
disregarding strict acoustic separations between distinct species of
governmental power.324 In this way, these decisions lower the barriers to
tyranny developing within the constitutional framework as a consequence of
one branch seizing an inordinate share of power. Hence, Chadha, Bowsher,
and Clinton might be read to impose inalienability rules when negative
liberty-related externalities outweigh the benefits of intermural dealmaking.
It is worth reiterating that it is no doubt true that certain intermural
deals should be prohibited due to negative externalities. But I am skeptical
that the Court has successfully identified instances in which such a ban is
warranted. Neither the democratic accountability nor the anti-tyranny
accounts of Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton are persuasive. First, a
democratic accountability defense of those cases necessarily rests upon
some estimate of voter confusion, the availability of proxies for voters, and
the offsetting benefits of institutional displacement. Such a defense would
also need to account for the possibility that the challenged institutional
modifications might in some instances lower the costs of democratic
accountability. The line-item veto, for example, might ease democratic
accountability by “improv[ing] the transparency of budget decisions to
voters.”325 Yet the Court’s decisions are bereft of the necessary empirical
investigations necessary to justify its conclusion that the institutional
innovations in Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton in fact undermined
democratic accountability
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Furthermore, arguments against the legislative veto, sequester, and
line-item veto from liberty externalities also founder on profound
conceptual difficulties and empirical uncertainty. It is very plausible to
think that the correlation between liberty and mandated separations of
institutional power is, in fact, very weak.326 I therefore doubt the threshold
assumption that separated powers consistently produce positive externalities
to begin with. Even setting aside that possibility, the outcomes in these
cases are hard to justify. The Court simply lacked any warrant for
concluding that the institutional innovations it has struck down diminish
rather than augment liberty interests. Hence, even as interbranch
consolidation of power enlarges government power, it might do so by
reducing rent-seeking and increasing the rationality and predictability of
federal action.327 These liberty-promoting effects might dominate any loss
in liberty from the concentration of government power. In the same way,
election rules that “entrench one vision of democracy,”328 and so protect
incumbents, also create the stability and predictability necessary for
democracy. In both contexts, agency costs might be smaller than stability
and predictability gains.329 Further, even brief reflection on the history of
federal interventions on civil rights issues should reveal that centralizing
power can sometimes redistribute liberty interests between different social
groups so as to expand the net enjoyment of liberty under the
Constitution—not to mention leaving that liberty allocated in more just
arrangements.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to get more traction on the idea of
externalities from institutional deals by considering the possibility that
elected agents will be most likely to self-deal when there is unified rather
326
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than divided government. Deals with potential institutional competitors
might be a way for incumbents to reduce the risk that malfeasance, rentseeking or neglect will come to voters’ attention through institutional
conflict and competition.330 This would suggest that courts should look
especially closely at deals struck by institutions controlled by the same
political party, and allow bipartisan deals (such as the line-item veto and the
original legislative veto) a greater margin of appreciation.
In sum, negative externalities sounding in liberty terms may well
supply a justification for some inalienability rules. But specification of such
a limit demands careful empirical evaluation of a law’s effect upon
democratic accountability and other important values. The Court is not
clearly well-placed to engage in this sort of predictive and wide-ranging
inquiry. The Court’s interventions in Chadha, Bowsher, and Clinton cannot
be defended as reasoned and informed evaluations of negative externalities.
More generally, federal judges are poorly positioned to ascertain when an
institutional bargain creates negative externalities. And they may be
discomforted by the need to treat divided and unified government as
constitutionally distinct. Instead, it should be up to officials, and their
constituents, to ascertain in the first instance when institutional bargains
illicitly compromise the positive liberty externalities of the constitutional
framework. Judicial intervention, by contrast, should be cautious and
deferential.
B.

Paternalism and Intermural Bargaining

It may seem that the second justification for limiting Coaseanbargaining—paternalism-warranting internalities—does not translate well to
the institutional context. Institutions, unlike individuals, do not deploy what
Daniel Kahneman calls “System 1” heuristics as a shortcut for making
demanding decisions.331 Institutions comprised of plural natural persons
instead employ a variety of decision-making processes involving multiple
stages and many individuals. In doing so, however, they must identify ways
to overcome paradoxes of aggregation that lead to cycling problems332 and
330
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overcome collective action hurdles. When they fail to do so, they may
suffer from ‘internalities’ that can be invoked to justify paternalistic limits
on institutional bargaining.
It is familiar fare that institutions can suffer from collective
pathologies that impede rational pursuit of recognized self-interest.333
Perhaps the most important cleft between institutional interest and
institutional action here will emerge through failures of collective action.
Institutions composed of plural members, and whose decisions depend on
the aggregation of individual members’ preferences, can fail to reach
outcomes that maximize collective welfare under certain conditions. The
most important of these is the tragedy of the commons, “in which what is
best for each person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas
everyone would have been better off with mutual cooperation.” 334 A
paternalism justification might apply if an institutional entitlement was held
by a collective in common, for example a group of legislators or a group of
states, and the collective was routinely unable to overcome its internal
transaction costs to engage in desirable coordinated action. This might
result in intermural trading in which the collective ‘sells’ the entitlement on
the cheap due to its inability to cohere behind a single bargaining position.
Worse, collective inaction might lead to anomie or wholesale atrophy of an
entitlement.335
Concerns about collective action ‘internalities’ of this kind might
hence be a platform for judicial intervention in favor of Congress and
against the executive branch in the separation of powers context. Congress,
that is, suffers from a collective-action internality. The legislature is a plural
entity with higher decision costs than the relatively centralized and
hierarchical executive. In contrast to the ceaseless churning of biennial and
sextennial elections, the executive is able to maintain a cadre of long-term
civil servants and bureaucrats who identify consistently with Article II
333
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aspirations, gather stocks of knowledge necessary to their defense, and
develop strategic, long-term plans to further that goal.336 For example, the
Office of Legal Counsel, which furnishes legal opinions on questions of
constitutional and statutory law raised by executive action, tends to hold a
“robust conception[n] of presidential power” regardless of party
affiliation.337 It has also developed a system of stare decisis for its written
work product338 The result of this institutional asymmetry in collective
action costs is an imbalance in the branches’ willingness to vindicate their
respective institutional interests. Moreover, it may well be that judicial
attention should be more rigorous in periods of unified rather than divided
government, since when the White House and Congress are in the same
hands, the temptation to allow institutional interests to slide may be
especially acute.
This argument is appealing in theory. But it is not clear that courts in
practice are well situated to make the necessary judgments about
institutional internalities. To the contrary, the available evidence suggests
courts tend to compound internalities, not resolve them. Perhaps the most
forceful argument for a paternalism-based limitation on intermural bargains
to date has been offered by Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison.
They persuasively criticize the courts’ longstanding use of interbranch
custom as a “gloss” on interbranch relations on the ground that “Congress
as a body does not systematically seek to protect its prerogatives against
presidential encroachment” due to “collective action problems and veto
limitations.”339
But whereas Bradley and Morrison’s argument wisely counsels for
skepticism of historical gloss as a means to narrow legislative and increase
presidential authority,340 federal courts continue to deploy custom as a way
to transfer authority from Article I to Article II. 341 In so doing, courts
336
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amplify a distorting imbalance endogenous to the constitutional structure
rather than ameliorating it. In lieu of resorting to custom when resolving
interbranch disputes, federal judges may do better by forcing interbranch
trades to go through bicameralism and presentment, especially if partisan
linkages and presidential influence on the law-making process addresses the
risk of legislative hold-outs.
Moreover, to the extent that there is an asymmetry between
Congress and the executive, it is not clear that the judiciary supplies the best
remedy. As previously noted, judges tend to hew to their appointing
president’s views.342 Given how many Article III judges previously worked
within U.S. Attorneys’ office, this is perhaps no surprise. Rather than
attempting to reorient the appointment process, Congress may be better
advised to seek an endogenous solution to its asymmetrical relation to the
executive. Congress, for example, might seek to create a repository of
institutional legal opinions to serve as its standard-bearing in interbranch
battles akin to OLC. Or it might seek to impose more restraints on legal
interpretation within the executive branch through its appropriations power.
The precise solution is less important here than the idea that restoring the
interbranch equilibrium need not involve the federal courts.
In sum, paternalism-warranting internalities may well be a separate
ground for resisting certain intermural deals, particularly when these are
reached through incremental and inattentive drift rather than formal
negotiation. But this does not mean that courts are well positioned to make
paternalistic judgments about the limits of intermural Coasean bargaining.
To the contrary, courts have in fact systematically failed to police
internalities. Once more, this suggests that the existence of limits to
negotiation between institutions should not be confused with a compelling
need for judicial enforcement. The framework for assessing institutional
deals, which comprises a default rule and two exceptions, is better deployed
in the first instance by officials and their constituents in the course of
departmentalist and popular judgments about new institutional
arrangements, with judicial review as a secondary resort.
Conclusion
Institutional bargains are a persistent aspect of the constitutional
order. They are inevitable because of both the text’s incomplete
342
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specification of initial entitlements and the tectonic pressures of exogenous
economic, social, and geopolitical change. Not that this inevitability should
be bemoaned. Intermural deals are often a desirable means of resolving
constitutional ambiguities, adapting to changed conditions, and realizing
new policy goods.
Rather than resisting the inevitable, I have proffered a general
framework for evaluating the ensuing deals. To that end, I have adapted the
simple rule deployed in private law analyses of bargaining. As a default
matter, I suggest, intermural deals reallocating institutional interests should
be viewed as acceptable in the absence of concerns about either negative
externalities or paternalism-warranting internalities. Without endeavoring
any comprehensive accounting of those categories, I have started to sketch
how they might be operationalized. Rather than relying on courts, which are
not well-positioned to make judgments about the limits of intermural
bargains, and which have rendered poor decisions in the separation-ofpowers context previously, I have suggested that the general framework
developed here should be employed in departmentalist and popular
judgments of the constitution. Adoption of the framework, when coupled
with judicial humility, should bring into crisper focus the many and varied
forms of institutional bargaining that contour, delimit, and enable the
routine operation of our constitutional dispensation.
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